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Abstract
Zababdeh: A Palestinian Water History
by
Julia S. Templin, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2011
Major Professor: Dr. Christopher Conte
Department: History
This study explores the historical evolution of the water situation in Palestine at
a local level in the West Bank village of Zababdeh. The thesis examines Palestine’s
geography and the historical relationship of Zababdeh’s people with this
environment. A sudden shift in this relationship took place during the second half
of the 20th century, particularly after the advent of Israeli occupation. The thesis
also addresses the Palestinians’ involvement, or lack thereof, in water politics of the
West Bank during the 20th century. The pattern of neglect has left Palestinians in a
weak position to secure safe and reliable water supplies for villages like Zababdeh.
Though some have speculated that the water situation in Palestine will one day lead
to violent conflict, the example of Zababdeh’s water history shows that such conflict
has not yet occurred because the village’s inhabitants experienced many new
water-related conveniences under Israeli occupation. The new conveniences left
Zababdeh’s people relatively contented and without incentive to fight over water.
The study finds that water is an underlying, and sometimes overt stress that has
been exacerbating the conflict in Palestine for decades and will continue to foster
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instability in the region until the people of Palestine all have safe, consistent, and
sufficient supplies of water for their needs.
(125 pages)
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To the people of Zababdeh, with hope for your peaceful future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: The Problem of Water in Palestine

Problem
I first became aware of the problem of water in Palestine when I was fifteen
years old, living with my family in Zababdeh, West Bank. We could turn on a
pump to refill our rooftop tank with water from the cistern below our house.
Sometimes we forgot about the pump until water spilled over the edge of the tank.
The eight-year-old son of our downstairs neighbor would come running up to our
door, pointing at the roof and saying “water, water.” I had never thought before
about where the water running through the tap came from, let alone what would
happen if it stopped coming. For my neighbor, though, and everyone else in
Zababdeh, this was a daily concern.
This thesis tells the story of the inhabitants of the village of Zababdeh, in
relation to their water. The Palestinian village lies within the West Bank
governorate of Jenin, the area that has recently become the Palestinian heartland.1
One of the few predominantly Christian communities in the West Bank,2 Zababdeh
is in many ways very unique. It also typifies rural Palestine as a small, remote
1

Since Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, Israeli settlements and roads have carved the
Palestinian territory into isolated sections of Palestinian settlement. The Jenin governorate holds
the most contiguous strings of Palestinian communities in the territory and is now considered the
most viable center for a Palestinian state.
2
The CIA World Factbook reports the following statistics on religion in the West Bank: Muslim
75% (predominantly Sunni), Jewish 17%, Christian and other 8%. Central Intelligence Agency, “The
World Factbook,” url: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world- factbook/
(accessed Oct. 22, 2010), located in “The West Bank,” under “People.”

2
village in the mountains. The geographical unavailability of water and the
inhabitants’ historical usage of and access to the resource is not unlike many other
Palestinian communities in the region.
The water history of Zababdeh falls within the broader discussion of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the role of water in that fiery and prolonged struggle
that spanned the entire 20th century and beyond. The center of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is fundamentally a question of land. The refugee
problem, the status of Jerusalem, borders, and other obstacles to resolving the
conflict tie back to rights to the land. Inseparably connected to the land dispute is
the debate over water resources, who owns them, who has rights to use them, and
how they should be managed. Of all the issues driving the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, water is perhaps the most important since it is a vital resource for survival,
and it may yet prove to be one of the most difficult issues to resolve.

Research Statement
While Palestine, and particularly the modern conflict there, is a popular topic
for research and debate, very few scholarly works focus specifically on the history of
the Palestinian people. The rural inhabitants of the West Bank mountain region in
particular have largely remained faceless and voiceless through history. This study
aims to fill in a small section of that enormous gap. Like the seminal work of
Beshara Doumani, my thesis is an attempt at “writing Palestinians into history.”3
The thesis further aims to explain the recent prominence of water as an issue in
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by examining the history of the resource in
Zababdeh. Although water in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been studied in
3

Beshara B. Doumani, “Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into History,”
Journal of Palestine Studies 21, no. 2 (1992): 5–28, url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25372
16 (accessed Oct. 18, 2010); See also Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and
Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995).

3
some depth from political and technical perspectives, a historical perspective is
lacking. This study shows the historical evolution of the water situation in Palestine
at a local level in the little village. Although Zababdeh is only one small
community, the village’s history contributes to an overall understanding of why the
water issue has increasingly become a tense and emotional problem for the
Palestinian people in recent years.
The story of Zababdeh illustrates the frustration of many Palestinians with their
water situation. The 20th century saw drastic changes to their lifestyles,
particularly the ways in which the village’s inhabitants accessed and used water.
These changes were accompanied by consistent failure of governments in the West
Bank to provide clean and consistent supplies of water to Zababdeh. Moreover,
under Israeli occupation, people in Zababdeh found themselves restricted from
improving their quality of life themselves, not because of the unavailability of
technology or their lack of ingenuity, but because of Israeli control over their water
resources. Water is a crucial issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because it is a
daily concern that creates stress and tension for many Palestinians who do not have
access to an adequate supply of the vital resource. Without responding to
Palestinians’ right to this basic human need, the conflict will only intensify and the
lives of the Palestinian people cannot improve.

Literature Review
The schools of thought on water in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict deal primarily
with the question of whether water scarcity leads to conflict or cooperation. Many
studies address this issue in the Middle East in general and feature the water
resources of Palestine prominently. One study by Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson
poses the question of conflict or cooperation for several different rivers in the Middle
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East, including the Jordan River that borders Palestine. Naff and Matson’s study
takes a very balanced view: “It is unlikely that water tensions alone will soon lead
to major military encounters among the Jordan [River] riparians. Water tensions,
however, may greatly aggravate the conflict once it is sparked by other interests.”4
The authors also note that water often engenders cooperation, perhaps because the
parties involved recognize the issue’s volatility.5 In the case of the Jordan River,
they find that tensions will likely increase over time, but the involved parties will
attempt to ease these tensions through cooperation, as Jordan and Israel did
through their 1994 peace treaty.6
Naff and Matson make a typical assumption that the parties involved in the
regional water dispute are the countries of Israel and Jordan. As is common in
studies predating the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations of the 1990s, the Palestinians,
as a stateless people, are not considered significant actors in the situation. The
study focuses on the waters of the Jordan River, but cannot neglect noting the role
of the West Bank and its underground water resources in the regional dispute.
What the authors fail to adequately assess is the potential role of the Palestinian
inhabitants in conflict or cooperation over the territory’s water.
Other authors argue along similar lines that water in the Middle East, and
particularly in Palestine, can either lead to violent conflict or act as a forum for
cooperative measures. Bolstered by predictions like that of former United Nations
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali that “the next war in our region will be
over the waters of the Nile,”7 or former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat asserting
4

Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson, eds., Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?
(London: Westview Press, 1984), 57.
5
Ibid., 3.
6
Ibid., 61.
7
Quoted in Jon Barnett, “Destabilizing the Environment-Conflict Thesis,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 2 (April 2000), url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097674 (accessed
Oct. 18, 2010): 276.
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that “the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water,”8 some authors
warn of an impending possibility for water wars. John Cooley, Joyce Starr, and
Hussein Amery each treat the potential for such wars as, in Amery’s words, “a
looming threat.”9
The wars that the articles seem to predict, however, have yet to materialize.
Cooley suggests that Israel ought to publicly declare that it does not plan diversion
of Arab rivers (the Litani, Orontes, or others) as a bare minimum to head off a
water war. Starr warned that a water crisis could erupt after the end of the Gulf
War. Amery does not actually predict a future water war, but describes how a
situation that developed between Israel and Lebanon almost became a water war.
None of these scenarios featured by the authors translate to any actual violent
conflict over water resources in the region.
The general absence of violent conflict over water has led critics to suggest that
the theory’s authors fail to clearly define some of the language used in their
discourse (i.e., a definition of “conflict”) and contend that water wars are a myth.10
Barnett asserts that “the argument about water wars is overstated, is a particular
product of strategic rationality, and undervalues the historical and contemporary
evidence that water is as likely to ‘cement peace’ as it is to induce violence.”11
Barnett specifically critiques Starr and Cooley who, in their articles, encourage
the US to alter its role in Middle East water politics. The very nature of these
articles is strategic, which is probably why they were published in Foreign Policy.
8

Joyce R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy 82 (Spring 1991): 17–36, url: http://www.
jstor.org/stable/1148639 (accessed Oct. 18, 2010).
9
John K. Cooley, “The War over Water,” Foreign Policy, no. 54 (Spring 1984), url: http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/1148352 (accessed Oct. 18, 2010): 16; Starr, see n. 8, 17-36; Hussein A.
Amery, “Water Wars in the Middle East: A Looming Threat,” The Geographical Journal 168, no. 4
(December 2002), url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3451474 (accessed Oct. 18, 2010): 314.
10
See Juha I. Uitto and Aaron T. Wolf, “Water Wars? Geographical Perspectives: Introduction,”
The Geographical Journal 168, no. 4 (December 2002), url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/
3451472 (accessed Oct. 18, 2010): 289; Barnett, see n. 7, 276.
11
Barnett, see n. 7, 276.

6
Barnett’s disapproval of their “strategic rationality” seems founded on differences in
epistemology rather than factual errors. A clear misinterpretation lies in Barnett’s
belief that the water war thesis neglects the possibility of using water to establish
peace. Starr and Cooley each noted the importance of water issues in peace
negotiations, but even more, they warned of the volatility of the water situation and
potential violence in hopes that such conflict might be averted.
The fact that water wars are not typical in the water-scarce Middle East bolsters
the argument of those who advocate water as an opportunity for cooperation.
Munther Haddadin reviews the history of water plans and negotiations in the region
around Palestine and contends that water “can never cause a war.” Rather, he uses
the example of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1994 to show that
water can be a conduit for peace. While water relations in the region are best
between Israel and Jordan, Haddadin believes that other parties can reach solutions
to their water disagreements.12
Aaron Wolf combats the idea that water causes wars through his search for
instances where water was the driver of interstate violence. Citing thousands of
water treaties in comparison to virtually no “water wars,” the author determines
that water issues lend themselves better to cooperation than conflict.13
A critic of both the water conflict and water cooperation theories, Jan Selby
argues that water is a matter of political economy.14 He downplays the importance
of water in Middle East interstate conflicts, rejecting typical examples like
12

Munther J. Haddadin, “Water in the Middle East Peace Process,” The Geographical Journal
168, no. 4 (December 2002), url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3451475 (accessed Oct. 18,
2010): 337.
13
A. Wolf, “Conflict and cooperation along international waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2
(1998), url: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VHR-3VXY5MH-R/2/5f0a480
b4ec90d81f008fdb3f77e746e (accessed Oct. 18, 2010): 289.
14
Jan Selby, “The Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East: Fantasies and Realities,” Third
World Quarterly 26, no. 2 (March 2005): 329–349, url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993731
(accessed Oct. 18, 2010).

7
arguments that the 1967 Six Day War was motivated by water. Similarly, he
believes water does not lead peace making, but falls within existing peace talks as
an issue of only minor importance. While he finds water insignificant at an
interstate level, the author claims that water plays a much larger role in local
politics. The conditions of poor water quality and uncertain supplies, according to
Selby, often lead to fierce competition for water supplies locally.
Seif Da’na also addresses water in terms of political economy in one of the few
studies directly concerned with history and water in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict.15 His dissertation is not a history of water in the conflict, but is about the
writing of the conflict’s history and argues that water illustrates the “real cause” of
the conflict: class struggle. He critiques the historiography of the conflict and
argues that the traditional nationalist narratives ignore this real cause. By applying
a political-economic approach to the case of water control and distribution, he
claims that inequality, demonstrated by the inequitable distribution of water, drives
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Da’na explains the principle of inequitable distribution of resources by ascribing
it to a class struggle between “ethnic” Palestinians and Israelis.16 Although we may
justifiably divide Palestinians and Israelis into separate social classes as Da’na does,
such a simplistic division along national lines ignores the existing class systems that
might better inform his study. Within the groups of Palestinians and Israelis are
many levels of society in varying circumstances. Selby acknowledges this fact in
15

Seifdeen Nathmy Da’na, “The Political Economy and Ecology of Water: A Contribution to
Rewrite the History of the Arab-Israeli Struggle” (PhD diss., Kansas State University, 2000). Da’na
refers to the conflict as an Arab-Israeli struggle because, first, Palestinians are Arabs, and second,
the establishment of the state of Israel created the conditions for conflict with neighboring Arab
countries (see p. 16). Although Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian-Israeli conflict are often used
interchangeably, the two conflicts are fundamentally different, as I explain in the ”Background”
section of this introduction. The conflict Da’na addresses takes place between Palestinians and
Israelis, so I replace his reference to the “Arab-Israeli” struggle or conflict with “Palestinian-Israeli.”
16
Ibid., 28.

8
terms of water supply and demand patterns in the West Bank, which “vary not only
between Israeli settlements and Palestinian towns and villages, but also between
and even within Palestinian communities.”17 In the case of water, for instance, rural
Palestinians are generally more likely to live in a home not connected to a water
network than urban Palestinians. His general division of the masses ignores the
value of understanding smaller-scale experiences of communities and individuals.
Moreover, the author’s assertion that inequality embodies the Palestinian-Israeli
struggle is again overly simplistic.18 Certainly inequality plays a role in the struggle.
Obvious tension over the water consumption gap between Palestinians and Israelis
has only further complicated the conflict. But conflict as a representation of class
inequality, as Da’na argues all forms of struggle are,19 would suggest that the party
in the inferior situation would have the motivation to struggle for change and
therefore be the aggressor. It is just as possible, though, that the party in the better
situation, or even parties in a situation of equality, might find their situation still
inadequate and initiate conflict to improve it. The presence of class inequality is not
a precondition for struggle or conflict, nor is it necessarily present in all struggles.
The primary contribution of Da’na’s work to the study of water in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is that it addresses the water issue as critical to the
overall understanding of the conflict. Water is not the only important issue in the
conflict, but its resolution is a necessary step to the resolution of the conflict as a
whole.
17
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Study Area and Nomenclature
This study concerns the Palestinian people, and Palestine is the anglicized
version of Filastin, their current name for the area, so it is the name I have chosen
to use.20 Palestine is bounded on the north by Lebanon, the east by Jordan, the
south by the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, and the west by the Mediterranean Sea, as
shown in figure 1.1. The area corresponds to that of the British Mandate for
Palestine, the time period in which this study commences.21 After the termination
of the Mandate in 1948, part of the territory became the State of Israel, while
Jordan (then still called Transjordan) and Egypt took control of the remaining
territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively. During the Arab-Israeli
war of 1967, the Six Day War, Israel acquired these two territories and occupied
them.22 The two areas collectively are now usually referred to as the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (OPT).
While this thesis generally deals with conflict in Palestine as a whole, specific
focus is placed on the mountainous West Bank territory. The village of Zababdeh in
the Jenin governorate of the northern West Bank (see figure 1.2) provides a case
study for the water history of West Bank Palestinians in this rural, mountainous
region.
20

For a discussion on the history of Palestine’s name, see Bernard Lewis, “Palestine: On the
History and Geography of a Name,” The International History Review 2, no. 1 (January 1980):
1–12, url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40105058 (accessed Oct. 18, 2010).
21
I refer here to the British Mandate excluding Transjordan, which separated from the Mandate
for Palestine in 1921.
22
Israel also occupied the Sinai Peninsula, an Egyptian territory, and the Golan Heights, from
Syria. Over a decade later, Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt in a peace treaty. The Golan was
annexed to Israel shortly afterwards, but since it was not part of Mandate Palestine, nor considered
by Palestinians as part of their homeland, it does not fall within the borders of Palestine in this
study.
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Fig. 1.1: Map of Palestine
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Fig. 1.2: Zababdeh, in the Jenin governorate of the West Bank
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Background on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict
The thesis of Zababdeh’s water history is set within the context of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The conflict differs from the related Arab-Israeli conflict
in that the latter incorporates several Arab states in the region and their wars and
disputes with Israel, while the Palestinian-Israeli conflict specifically addresses the
issues between Palestinians and Israelis. Both conflicts cite similar origins and for
many years followed the same path. The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, though, shifts
focus from the inter-state conflict in the Middle East to the mostly localized
struggle between a stateless people and an occupying power.
Origins of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis typically date to the late
1800s. Palestine made up a small portion of the Ottoman Empire that controlled
most of the Middle East from the 16th century until the end of World War I in
1918. The small strip of land was a “poor and neglected part of the Ottoman
Empire.”23 Essentially, the region, receiving little attention from the empire, became
disorderly, and the people there were left to fend for themselves under the corrupt
and inconsistent local governance.
To some degree, the inattentiveness of the Ottomans allowed the people of
Palestine to continue practicing their established traditions of land ownership and
use,24 and they even enjoyed “full civil and political rights equally with Ottoman
citizens.”25 However, because of the empire’s disconnect with situations in Palestine,
it could, and sometimes did, violate local traditions of ownership by confiscating
and redistributing lands and evicting the peasant Arabs who worked them.26
23
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24
For a discussion of such traditions within the Palestinian economy during the Ottoman Empire,
see Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900, see n. 3.
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37.

13
Toward the end of Ottoman rule in the late 19th century, Zionism, a movement
to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine,27 picked up momentum. As
anti-Semitism flourished in Europe, many Jews looked to their ancient homeland for
refuge. Between the years 1882 and 1903, 25,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine in
the first aliyah.28
Although Jews had maintained a constant presence in Palestine since antiquity,
the resurgence of immigration around 1900 created a tense atmosphere. As Zionists
arrived, they regularly purchased land from “absentee land owners,” landlords who
had acquired their holdings during the Ottoman Land Reforms of the mid-1800s,
but often lived in cities far from the land. In fact, more than fifty percent of the
Zionists’ land purchased was from large absentee owners, while less than ten percent
was from the fellaheen, the Arab peasants who worked the land.29
The situation was shortly aggravated by the events of World War I and the
British administration in Palestine during the years after the war. The British
government made contradictory promises to both Jewish and Arab leaders during
the war. The Balfour Declaration, a letter from the British Cabinet sent to Baron
Lionel Rothschild in 1917, expressed Britain’s favour of “the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”30 while the Husain-McMahon
Correspondence, consisting of two letters and several oral messages relayed by
representatives of Sir Henry MacMahon and Sharif Husain between 1915 and 1916,
27

This definition of Zionism is the declared Zionist purpose according to the Basel Declaration,
a document constructed at the First Zionist Congress, held in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. See “The
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(New York: Praeger, 1991).
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York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1996), 26. The term aliyah, as defined in Bickerton and Klausner, see
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United Kingdom Foreign Office, “Balfour Declaration,” 2 November 1917, in UNISPAL, url:
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d052565fa00705c61?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,balfour (accessed Jan. 18, 2010).
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emphasized Britain’s desire for Arab independence and establishment of a caliphate
in the Arab lands.31
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the war, the League of
Nations orchestrated the Mandate system. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations charged “advanced nations” with the tutelage of “peoples not yet able to
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.” The
system provided for three types of mandates, A, B, and C, with varying degrees of
control and administration. The former Ottoman territories, type A, received the
least oversight. They were deemed developed enough to warrant only “the rendering
of administrative advice and assistance” by a European power.32
Palestine thus fell under British administration, along with the territories that
are now Jordan and Iraq. After five years of military administration, the British
Mandate for Palestine was formally ratified in 1922. The document of the mandate,
as well as the 1922 White Paper, a British policy statement issued earlier that year,
affirmed support for the Zionist program of establishing a homeland in Palestine.33
During this time under the British Mandate, conflict among the Jews, Arabs,
and the British continued to escalate. Violence erupted in 1929 over Jewish rights
to worship at Jerusalem’s Western, or Wailing Wall located on Arab waqf land.34
The incident set off a series of investigations, reports, and policy statements. Zionist
outcry at the documents that suggested limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine
31

“Husain-McMahon Correspondence” in Geddes, see n. 27, 23-28.
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United Kingdom, “The Churchill White Paper,” 3 June 1922, in UNISPAL, url: http://
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led the British Prime Minister to issue a letter reversing that policy, to the outrage
of Arabs.35
The tension climaxed with a protracted Arab insurgency against the British
control and, even more so, continued Jewish immigration. The Arab Rebellion of
1936-1939 prompted another British investigation and policy statement. The Peel
Commission, deeming the overall situation irrepressible, recommended for the first
time partitioning the land of Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish.36 The
policy statement issued two years later, the 1939 White Paper, ignored
recommendations of the Peel Commission and called for limitation and eventual
cessation of Jewish immigration, in addition to the creation of a “united
independent Palestine state,” unifying all peoples of the land.37 This paper was
vehemently opposed by both Arabs and Jews.
As the situation in Palestine became increasingly difficult, Britain eventually
turned the problem over to the post-World War II replacement for the League of
Nations, the United Nations (UN). In 1947, the UN General Assembly passed
Resolution 181, known as the UN Partition Plan.38 The plan called for two separate
states, a Palestinian one and a Jewish one, and the internationalization of
Jerusalem.
Arab leaders vehemently rejected the plan. The Jews, however, proclaimed their
state immediately following the end of the British Mandate on May 14, 1948. The
35
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following day, the armies of neighboring Arab countries, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,
Transjordan (now Jordan), and Iraq, attacked the new Jewish state of Israel. After
a year of fighting, Israel was not only successful in defending its partitioned territory
from the coordinated attack of the surrounding Arab countries but also gained and
annexed additional territory that had been intended for the Arab state in Palestine.
The remaining areas for the planned Arab state, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, fell
under the control of Jordan and Egypt, respectively. Nearly a million Arab
inhabitants of the area that became Israel fled their homes, many to nearby Arab
nations, marking the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem.39
After the 1948 War, the new state of Israel fought in a succession of wars with
its Arab neighbors. Most of these wars involved the Arab premise that Israel was an
illegal state and should be driven from Arab lands, while Israel was determined to
eliminate threats to its right to exist. Exacerbated by Cold War tensions through
the 1950s and 1960s, the conflict reached a turning point in June of 1967. Hostile
rhetoric and aggressive military movements on the part of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan
contributed to Israel’s preemptive strike that started a war lasting only six days.
The Six Day or June War resulted in Israel’s acquisition of several Arab
territories identified in figure 1.3 , including the Golan Heights, seized from Syria,
the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Gaza Strip and Sinai
Peninsula from Egypt.40 Immediately after the conquest, Israel occupied and
annexed East Jerusalem, and several years later, the Syrian Golan Heights as well.
The Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were also occupied and
Israeli settlements soon dotted the land.
Later that year, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242 which, among
39

Cattan, see n. 25, 60.
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40
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Fig. 1.3: The Six Days War, territory occupied by Israel in 1967.
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other things, called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied
territories.41 However, Israel refused to withdraw from the territories, and Syria
opposed the clause in the resolution that implied Israel’s right to exist. The
resolution notably did not take into account the plight of the Palestinians, whether
refugees or inhabitants of the Israeli occupied territories.
The territories remained a source of conflict in the region. Partly in an attempt
to regain their lost territories, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel
in 1973 on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement.42 Despite substantial losses
in the first few days of the war, Israel pushed back the Arab forces after a massive
American arms airlift.43
Additionally, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a guerilla
organization of refugee Palestinians, launched attacks into Israel from bordering
countries. The invasion of “southern” Lebanon in 1982 (which actually turned out
to be an invasion as far as the capital in Beirut), was an attempt to stop the
shelling by the PLO across Israel’s northern border.44 The resistance movement
spread to the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the first
intifada, or Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation in 1988. The uprising was
reprised in 2000 when Israeli Defense Force troops marched on the holy Haram
al-Sharif in Jerusalem, instigating the second, or Al-Aqsa intifada.
Despite the protracted conflict over the land of Palestine, the region has seen
some efforts toward peace. In 1978, Egypt and Israel began negotiations at US
presidential retreat Camp David, eventually culminating in the signing of the
41
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Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty at the White house in 1979. One result of the treaty
was Israel’s return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Jordan followed suit in 1994
when the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty was signed, though this agreement did not
involve any exchange of territory. However, the first Palestinian intifada terminated
with the Israel-PLO peace accord in 1993 (Oslo I), which promised the gradual
transfer of powers in some parts of the occupied territories to a Palestinian
Authority. Two years later, in 1995, Israel and the PLO signed another accord that
laid out a framework for the proposed transfer of powers, which led to redeployment
of Israeli armed forces from some parts of the occupied territories and a limited
degree of Palestinian autonomy.45
Continued Palestinian and Israeli negotiations since 1995 have not yet
culminated in a final peace agreement, and many issues still drive the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Negotiators must understand and respond to the years
of history behind each of these issues if the issues are to be resolved in a lasting
agreement. This thesis addresses the history of one of these issues, water, as a
starting point for shifting some of the focus on the remaining issues in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict to their historical roots.

Sources
Oral interviews form the primary basis for my study of water in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the summer of 2008 I spent nearly two months
interviewing Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank about the water situation
there. Most of the interviewees were residents of a little village called Zababdeh.
The majority of the interviewees were elderly residents, especially women, who
could remember the time of the British Mandate and Jordanian administration in
45
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their village. This group of people ranged from 61 years of age to 87 at the time of
interviewing. They came mostly from farming families who had lived in Zababdeh
for several generations.
Since Zababdeh’s elderly population spoke or understood little if any English, I
required a translator for the interviews. My translators were also Zababdeh
residents, each translating for different interviews. One of them was a policeman
and barber, and the other was a student at the nearby Arab American University.
Although both translators spoke proficient English, the translating process naturally
presented many limitations. We experienced the predictable difficulties of ensuring
the translator correctly understood my questions before attempting to relay them to
the interviewee and the reverse process of the translator interpreting the responses
and explaining them to me. On occasion, one translator also guided the interviews
by anticipating my questions and expecting specific answers. Consequently, he
sometimes left out parts of the responses or qualified them with an explanation of
why the interviewee said certain things.
Another common problem with oral interviews is the memory of interviewees.
Because most of them were elderly, I expected inconsistencies and forgetfulness in
their stories. For the most part, though, their recollections of life in Zababdeh when
they were growing up or during their young adulthood were surprisingly lucid. Even
the women in their 80s recounted anecdotes from their childhood in great detail.
The stories were personal accounts of Zababdeh inhabitants’ own lives, so the
natural biases of the interviewees, based on their individuality, were apparent and
expected. Their recollections were also colored by present situations. At the time of
the interviews, Zababdeh’s residents had gone through what they considered a year
of low rainfall, while the meager amounts of water they received in the village
network from the municipality came only every few weeks. Additionally, many of
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the questions I asked related to their perceptions and opinions about the changes
they had experienced over the course of their lives.
I carried out the interviews in a relaxed, informal setting. My translators
brought me to the homes of the interviewees, who were usually people they knew
personally. We always exchanged greetings and usually ate and drank something
before I took out the voice recorder for the interview. Often other family members
or friends were also in attendance, sometimes contributing their opinions to the
interview as well. I did not carry a list of questions but simply asked general
questions about the recollection of different eras of their lives in order to illicit their
stories and observations. The interviewees were very friendly and open with me
about their lives and the memories they had. To respect their privacy, I have only
used their first names throughout the thesis.
I also interviewed people outside Zababdeh with expertise in engineering,
archaeology and history, and policy and management. Since these experts were
well-educated and spoke English, I conducted the interviews without a translator.
The interviews added to the overall context of my research and provided valuable
information and perspective on the water problem in Palestine.
See Appendix A for information about my interviews with people from
Zababdeh and with professional interviewees. Also, see Appendix B for a note on
sources I used for primary documents.

Structure of the Study
Chapter two describes the unique geography and the water resources of Palestine
as a whole, and Zababdeh in particular. The inhabitants of the village primarily
utilized ancient methods of water storage and collection until the second half of the
20th century. Like many other communities in Palestine, Zababdeh also relied
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heavily on agriculture. After the Israeli occupation in 1967, the village experienced
drastic changes both in agricultural practices and domestic water use.
Chapter three highlights the absence of clear and defined Palestinian water
rights and by association the lack of clean, consistent supplies of water to
Palestinians. The people of Zababdeh were marginalized by every administration in
the West Bank from the British to the Palestinian Authority. These governments
failed to develop water resources and deliver municipal supplies to many villages like
Zababdeh, leaving those villages without reliable and clean water.
Chapter four addresses the absence of a water war in Palestine. It follows the
changes to the ways the people of Zababdeh both accessed and used water in the last
century. They experienced many improvements after the Israeli occupation in 1967,
leaving the older generation relatively contented. The visibility of an enormous
water consumption gap between Palestinians and Israelis, however, infuriates many
Palestinians and aggravates the already tense situation in the region.
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Chapter 2
A Fragile Geography, a Fragile History

Introduction
The unique and varied landscape of Palestine attracted many explorers and
scholars during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who created a
thorough foundation for the study of the region’s geography. Some of the earliest
works originated with an interest in Palestine as the “holy land,” often including
Greater Syria. One explorer and theologian, George Adam Smith, prefaced his
Historical Geography of the Holy Land by noting:
Students of the Bible desire to see a background and to feel an
atmosphere—to discover from ‘the lie of the land’ why the history took
certain lines and the prophecy and gospel were expressed in certain
styles—to learn what geography has to contribute to questions of
Biblical criticism—above all, to discern between what physical nature
contributed to the religious development of Israel, and what was the
product of purely moral and spiritual forces.1
Smith recognized the importance of understanding Palestine’s geography when
studying the paths of history and the perceptions of its writers.
The relationship between humans and their environment forms a central theme
in Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterranean. As he explains, it is “a history whose
passage is almost imperceptible. . . a history in which all change is slow, a history of
1
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constant repetition, ever-recurring cycles.”2 The slow, repetitious history of
geography differs from the shorter-term fluctuations and flares of social and
individual history.
Another scholar of history in the Mediterranean region, John McNeill, argued
that the mountainous regions surrounding the sea experienced “not mere
fluctuations within a broad and resilient equilibrium, but a sea change,” in many
cases within the last two hundred years.3 The stark changes in their relationship to
their environment many groups living in the Mediterranean mountains experienced
were, in McNeill’s view, more significant than the changes that occurred over the
course of centuries. Rather than a system of recurring cycles, he argues that the
mountains of the Mediterranean were subject to only a “fragile stability” and an
irregular “rhythm of ecological history.”4
The modern Palestinian-Israeli conflict raises questions about the significance of
geography in the conflict, especially in terms of the Palestinians’ struggle for water.
The West Bank, where most non-refugee Palestinians live, is a mountainous region
with scarce water resources. This chapter examines changes to the interaction
between the inhabitants of the village of Zababdeh and their mountain
environment, particularly their water resources. The chapter studies the geography
of Zababdeh within the context of the country as a whole, then explores how the
village’s inhabitants traditionally accessed and used water through the first half of
the 20th century. Like the Mediterranean Mountain groups McNeill describes, the
2
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people of Zababdeh experienced a fragile ecological stability throughout their
history. The second half of the 20th century saw developments, emerging mostly
during the era of Israeli occupation, that suddenly and drastically transformed the
previously slow-moving, cyclical relationship between Zababdeh’s inhabitants and
their environment.

The Environment

Climate and Topography
The thin strip of land that makes up historical Palestine, roughly 28,000 sq.
kilometers (11,000 sq. miles) in area, shows great geographic variability.5 Three
basic topographic zones make up the region: the Coastal Plain, the Central
Mountains, and the Jordan Valley.6 The zones run parallel to each other in
north-south belts, converging in a fourth zone, the Negev Desert to the south.7
Most locations in Palestine fall under a Mediterranean climate classification, with
warm, dry summers and cool, wet winters.8 However, Palestine lies at a crossroads
of three arid deserts—the Syrian, Arabian, and Sahara— which intersect with the
Mediterranean Sea along the country’s western edge. Smith described the region as
5
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“a bridge between Asia and Africa—a bridge with the desert on one side and the sea
upon the other.”9 In general, precipitation gradually decreases as one moves
eastward through Palestine. Additionally, rainfall decreases with southward
movement, while temperature increases. The result is lush, green hills and valleys in
the north that transition into a barren, arid desert in the south.
The westernmost zone of Palestine, flanking the Mediterranean Sea, is the
Coastal Plain. It stretches nearly 190 kilometers (120 miles) from the Plain of Acre
in the north to the Gaza Strip in the south.10 Today most of this area falls within
the boundaries of the State of Israel, while its southernmost stretch covers almost
the entire Gaza Strip.
Just east of the Coastal Plain runs the Central Mountain zone, which covers
most of the West Bank. The entire region, which occupies approximately 9,600 sq.
kilometers (3,700 sq. miles), is traversed by valleys. Within modern day Israel, the
northernmost section of the mountain zone, Upper Galilee, is a massive plateau
which descends into hills and east-west ridges. Across the low-lying Valley of Jezreel
that bisects the mountain zone stretch the 1,530 sq. kilometers (950 sq. miles) of
Samarian highlands, scattered with valleys. The Samarian highlands, within the
northern half of the West Bank, transition into the Coastal Plain to the west, and
to the east they drop off into the Jordan Valley. The southern half of the West
Bank hosts the slightly higher, more rugged, and typically more barren Judean
plateau, separated by a valley from the hills of the Shephelah to the west, the low
hills along the southern portion of the Coastal Plain (see figures 2.1 and 2.2).11
The Coastal Plain and Central Mountains see the most rainfall, though the
9
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Fig. 2.1: Samarian highlands. The mountains of Samaria tend to be shorter and
greener than those of Judea.
amount varies from year to year. While the plain is generally warm and humid, the
mountains tend to be slightly cooler because of their higher elevation.12 The
prevailing westerly winds typical of mid-latitude locations like Palestine push
moisture from the Mediterranean Sea inland. As it moves up the mountain slopes,
the air cools and its capacity to hold moisture decreases. During the wintertime
when temperatures are the lowest, rain drenches the coast and western slopes of the
mountain zone, with occasional snowfall in the highest elevations. Rainfall is rare in
summertime, though the high humidity often results in heavy morning dews.13
12
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Fig. 2.2: Judean highlands. In general, Judea has taller, steeper, drier mountains
than those in Samaria.
The eastern-most section of the country, the Jordan Valley, is a portion of the
Great Rift Valley that extends from Turkey to South Africa.14 Climate and
vegetation in the Jordan Valley vary according to altitude, which ranges from
approximately 200 meters (655 feet) above sea level to more than 400 meters (1,310
feet) below sea level, and according to latitude. The valley drops from the north of
the country near the Sea of Galilee into a low depression divided by the Jordan
River. Beyond the river’s termination in the Dead Sea, the elevation rises slightly
until it reaches the Red Sea at the southern tip of the country. The section of this
valley between the city of Beit She’an and the Dead Sea lies within the boundaries of
14
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the West Bank, while the remaining portion west of the river is in Israel’s territory.
The leeward side of the mountains extending into the Jordan Valley receives
much less precipitation than the coast and winward side of the mountians for two
reasons. First of all, most of the moisture has already condensed and fallen by the
time the air crosses the mountain peaks. The eastward side experiences a rain
shadow effect. Second, the slopes dropping into the Jordan Valley are much more
abrupt than their western counterparts that gently descend toward the
Mediterranean. The elevation change happens quite drastically, as does the rise in
temperature associated with lower elevation. Once again, the air is capable of
holding more moisture, so it no longer condenses and falls as easily. In the Jordan
Valley, winters are relatively warm and very humid, with only rare precipitation,
while the summers are hot and dry.15
The fourth zone, the Negev desert in the south of the country, falls almost
entirely within modern Israel. The large inverted triangle pointing toward the Red
Sea actually extends the other three parallel geographical zones southward. A small
section of the northwestern corner of the Negev makes up the southern-most portion
of the coastal plain. The central hills and rift valley also continue south through the
desert.16 The region, encompassing more than half the total area of Palestine, fits
into the semi-arid to arid desert climate categories.

Water Resources
Northern Palestine possesses several water bodies. Springs and rainwater runoff
collect in the Jordan, Palestine’s major river. The Upper Jordan River flows
15
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through the Huleh Valley then feeds the only freshwater lake in Palestine, the Sea of
Galilee.17 Emerging from the south end of the Sea of Galilee, the Lower Jordan
eventually terminates in the salty Dead Sea. In addition, rainfall runoff creates
seasonal streams that run through wadis and flow toward the Jordan River or the
Mediterranean Sea.18
Refurbishing of water bodies is due to the heavy precipitation of the rainy
season. Rains begin to fall usually in October or November, drop the most
precipitation from December to February, and diminish in March and April. Levels
of precipitation vary throughout the country, lessening with distance from the
Mediterranean and with decreasing latitude. Hence, the “sources” of the Jordan
River lie in the northern extremities of the country. The main sources are three
springs in the north, the Dan, Hasbani, and Banias springs (see figure 2.3), which
later become rivers.19 Runoff from Mt. Hermon, straddling Lebanon, Syria, and
Palestine, makes an important contribution to the Upper Jordan as well. As the
Jordan flows through the Huleh Valley to the Sea of Galilee, it is directly fed by
runoff and several other smaller springs.20 The Lower Jordan receives only a little
input from rainfall, although some tributaries, mostly ephemeral streams (aside from
the Yarmouk River to the east), drain into it until its termination in the Dead Sea.21
The underground aquifers also rely heavily on rainfall. As precipitation covers
the soil, water either continues to move over the soil as surface runoff, or it
penetrates the vadose zone, the unsaturated layer of the soil through which water
17
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Fig. 2.3: Upper Jordan River. The Banias River shown here originates at the Banias
Spring in northern Israel and is one of the three main sources of the Upper Jordan
River.
must pass before reaching the water table. The makeup of this layer influences the
ease with which water passes through it. In general, lighter soils are more
permeable, and heavy soils are less so. The Coastal Plain in Palestine is mostly a
light, sandy-loamy soil, and below it lies a massive underground aquifer, the Coastal
Aquifer, which runs practically the length of the coastline.
The Central Mountains, on the other hand, are mostly heavy soils, particularly
clay.22 Here, the soil has in many places been washed and denuded.23 These factors,
in combination with the problem of rainfall intensity, which limits the soil’s ability
to absorb water once it has been soaked, inhibit infiltration into the underground
aquifers. The limestone makeup of this area has also allowed for the creation of
22
23
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karsts, a geologic formation occurring where erosion dissolves rock surfaces and
widens fractures, often resulting in large caverns. Karsts drain the surface
precipitation into large underground aquifers. Although they are not characteristic
of all Palestine, they do help explain the existence of very wealthy aquifers in the
mountain region.
Three distinct aquifers have been identified in the Central Mountains of
Palestine, based on underground flow direction. They are the Western,
Northeastern, and Eastern aquifers. Rainfall on the slopes of the Central Mountains
serves to recharge the bulk of these aquifers, though seepage from surface water
contributes a little as well, particularly from the Jordan River to the Eastern
aquifer. As the aquifers recharge, the pressure from the rising water level in them
results in hundreds of springs throughout the country.

24

Springs emerge in places where the water table is exposed, often due to surface
erosion, and water can flow out of the aquifer. Many lie along the western slopes of
the mountain region and in the coastal plain.25 But the most productive are at
lower elevations, in valleys, on the coastal plain, or in the Jordan Valley, like the Ein
Gedi spring shown in figure 2.4.26 The water table is generally closer to the surface
in these areas.

Zababdeh’s Geography
The little hillside village of Zababdeh and the beautiful valley it overlooks lie in
the northern half of Palestine within the central mountain zone. Zababdeh falls
within the Jenin governorate of the West Bank. This area begins the descent from
24
Springs in turn feed the surface water bodies of Palestine, particularly the Jordan River
watershed as well as wadis and ephemeral streams that drain into the Mediterranean Sea.
25
Bonné, see n. 12, 261.
26
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Fig. 2.4: The Ein Gedi spring is located in the Jordan Valley near the Dead Sea.
the Samarian hills to the low-lying, fertile Jezreel Valley. The watershed catchment
area Zababdeh lies within feeds the northeastern mountain aquifer.
Under current political divisions, the total area of the Zababdeh district is 5,538
dunums (1,368 acres), approximately 937 dunums (232 acres) of which is built-up
area, while the remainder is mostly agricultural land.27 From the west, the village
views the Basin of Zababdeh that stretches east toward another rocky hillside (see
figure 2.5). Olive trees cover the hills, intermingling with the maquis shrub
emerging from amid the limestone caves and boulders. Almond, fig, and karab trees
occassionally appear as well, peaking over the cement walls surrounding a house or
offering shade along a roadside. While the dry summers see these trees and shrubs
adorned only by thistles, winter witnesses a flood of vibrant red anemones and other
27
World Vision-JWG, Jenin Assessment Program, under “Az Zababida” (n.p.: World Vision
International, March 2007).
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wildflowers in Zababdeh’s hills.
The low-lying Basin of Zababdeh and its thick, rocky clay soils play host to the
agricultural endeavors of the village’s inhabitants. Like the flowers on the hillside,
the vegetation in the valley also depends on seasonal rainfall. Zababdeh lies many
kilometers from the Jordan River and has no springs. Because of Zababdeh’s
situation, at a slightly higher elevation within the hills than nearby Jenin or
Qabatiya, the aquifer underneath lacks the pressure that causes springs to burgeon
from the ground just a few kilometers away in other cities and villages. Although
springs pepper the central mountain region, many rural villages of the West Bank
often find themselves rather isolated from these springs. Even the man-made wells
in the little village are few, and produce only meager amounts of water. Winter
rains alone feed the trees, flowers, and agricultural products of Zababdeh.

The Mountain People
The land of Palestine has been so thoroughly settled throughout history that one
would be hard-pressed to find an acre of ground that does not evince human
intrusion. Palestinian archaeologist Salah al-Houdalieh said that most of today’s
Palestinian villages, even the very small ones, have a history of continual occupation
from Roman, Byzantine, or Persian periods, or earlier.28 Numerous groups have
migrated through the region, and many different powers have controlled it. Amiran
sums up the general settlement patterns of Palestine throughout history as follows:
Whenever a satisfactory state of regional development and public
security permitted the organic utilization of the different parts of the
country the coastal plain gained supremacy and the leading city was a
city of the plain. Whenever conditions in the country deteriorated and
28
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Fig. 2.5: The basin of Zababdeh, viewed from a hillside overlooking the village.
settlement in the coastal plain became marginal, its towns decreased in
importance, and upland towns gained in relative importance. . . 29
The coastal plain offered more economic opportunity, providing access to the sea
and a relatively level route of passage, as well as light, fertile soils for agriculture.
But when invaders passed through or a disease became rampant, the coastal cities
shrank while the mountain settlements increased in size and importance.
Finklestein and Gophna identify the Chalcolithic to Early Bronze era as “the
first chapter of substantial human activity in the highlands.”30 Although initially
the settlements were evenly spread, by the Middle Bronze Age they differed based
29
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on where they were within the mountain region.31 The tablelands of Judaea had
settlements mostly on the hill-tops, though occasionally also on the slopes. Because
the hill-tops are relatively flat and rainfall is greater at the higher elevations,
cultivation has often been practiced there. Further north, in Samaria and Galilee,
the mountains are lower and intersected by fertile valleys. Most of the settlements
in the Samaria highlands, like Zababdeh, were on the slopes or at the base of the
mountains, with a few in the valleys.32
The origins of Zababdeh are fuzzy at best. Many of the village’s current
residents trace their roots to a few families that settled there around 1800 CE. The
surnames Daibes, Issaid, and Khalil Ibraheem are markers of longevity in the
village. These “founders” supposedly came from another Christian village,
Al-Taibeh, near Ramallah and Jerusalem.33 The three families may have purchased
the land from the Jarrar family, a wealthy land-owning family in the Jenin area.
One of my interviewees gave a different account of how they obtained the land,
though. Abu Jilal alleged that sometime during the Ottoman Empire, Turkish
officials came to Zababdeh and told the people that were living there that they
would have to pay taxes for the lands. The officials began assigning lands to certain
families, who, fearing the taxes, fled Zababdeh. According to Abu Jilal, four men
agreed to take “all the lands of Zababdeh.” Their only condition was that they
could choose lands that were near areas of high winter rainwater runoff (see figure
2.6). Consequently, the lands that belong to Zababdeh are “just where the water
url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1357359 (accessed Oct. 18, 2010), 8. The Chalcolithic era
was 4500 BCE to 3300 BCE; the Early Bronze era was 3300 BCE to 2000 BCE.
31
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32
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33
Zababdeh Official Website, “History,” url: http://www.zababdeh.com/historyphp.php
(accessed Oct. 25, 2010), Zababdeh’s website gives this account of the village’s founders. An undocumented story told to me by a resident of the village suggested at least one of these families
emigrated from Karak in Jordan in order to avoid legal action for a crime one of the family members
had committed that resulted in someone’s death. I was not able to substantiate this claim.
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goes, or runs during the winter.”34
Zababdeh, like many areas of settlement in Palestine today, hides vestiges of its
ancestors. One of my translators recalled an experience from his childhood when he
crawled inside a tunnel that led under the village where he found the remnants of a
previous village.35 Zababdeh’s official website claims the village has vestiges from
the Roman and Byzantine periods.36 Indeed, a visit to the Latin Church provides
the opportunity to view a clearly ancient mosaic on the floor. Some other
archaeological sites include the remains of ancient water systems, such as the
aqueduct of the Roman city of Caesarea, Hezekiah’s tunnel that connected the
Israelite capital of Jerusalem with the nearby Gihon springs, or Jacob’s Well of
Biblical tradition in the modern city of Nablus. The ancient town sleeping
underneath modern Zababdeh, however, boasts no wells or aqueducts. Instead, the
village relied on another ancient water structure: the cistern.
Rock-hewn cisterns can be found dotting the hills near Zababdeh. The Oxford
Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East gives the following description of
traditional cistern construction:
A cistern was normally cut out of rock and its interior coated with a
thick layer of impermeable plaster. . . A cistern’s depth would not
normally exceed 6 m, so that water could be drawn with relative ease
and the cistern could be cleaned by someone upright in it. . . The opening
of the cistern was usually narrow in order to prevent falling into it, to
prevent evaporation, and to enable convenient pumping. Canals carved
into the earth channeled runoff to a small depression or basin at the side
of the cistern, where the soil settled or was filtered.37
Evidence of the use of cisterns dates as early as the Chalcolithic period, with
34
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Fig. 2.6: A Zababdeh wadi, shown above, is an example of the areas of high winter
runoff that determined the borders of Zababdeh lands.
continued use through the Iron Age, Hellenistic period, Byzantine period, and
beyond.38 Many of the ancient cisterns all over Palestine are still in use.39
Cisterns were essential in places too far from springs to collect water every day.
Consequently, cisterns dot the central mountain region of Palestine. One observer
commented of the cisterns’ ubiquity:
As the period of rain is so short, the people are obliged to preserve as
much as possible in rock-cut cisterns, and in Jerusalem itself all, or
practically all the water is thus preserved. But not only in the towns is
this necessary; all vineyards must have cisterns. In one ancient vineyard
of not more than two acres I counted about fifty cisterns. . . 40
38
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All Zababdeh’s inhabitants relied on rainwater stored in cisterns throughout the
first half of the 20th century. My interviewees born in the 1920s and 1930s all told
the same story from their youths, until the 1950s, of the women hiking up
Zababdeh’s mountains to their family water cisterns to collect jars of water for the
day. Some cisterns could be found within the village, but as Miriam and Maria told
me, “the water was so dirty, [we] used it for cleaning house..and for animals.” They
only drank the water from the mountains that flowed into the cisterns over a much
cleaner rock catchment area.41
Mountain cistern water was rarely used for anything except drinking. Since no
other water resources (wells, rivers, springs) could be found in Zababdeh, the village
inhabitants used dry farming methods to grow their crops. People in other areas of
Palestine practiced irrigation since ancient times. The port city of Jaffa, for
example, was renowned in the early 20th century for its oranges, fed by the plentiful
springs and wadis of the Coastal Plain. In the Jordan Valley, where rainfall is low
but springs are plentiful, farmers dug canals to carry water through their lands to
irrigate such crops as date and banana palms.42
Since the springs of the mountian region are sparse and irregular, rainfall was
the most widespread water source for agriculture there. The heavy clay soil of
Zababdeh and the rest of the Central Mountains suited cereal crops such as wheat
and barley.43 These were generally planted in valleys of the mountain region during
November, just before the onset of the rainy season. Such winter crops lay dormant
through the rainy season, then grew through the spring and were generally ready for
41
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harvest by June. Farmers rotated the crops from year to year, planting wheat and
barley one year, then replacing the cereals with a leguminous crop the following
year or a summer crop such as durra or sesame.44 These crops survived without any
irrigation, relying solely on the moisture stored in the soil from the rainy season.
Perhaps the most valuable, and certainly the most beloved crop to the
inhabitants of the Central Mountains was the olive tree.45 Though initially the trees
needed some extra attention and water beyond what the rains supply, once they
matured, they survived on only seasonal rainfall.46 The trees provided not just the
olives themselves, typical at any dinner table in Palestine, but the oil that could be
used for cooking and fuel or could be made into soap. Zababdeh’s people especially
prized their olive trees. One of my translators said his father likes olive trees so
much that he works in the groves as a hobby.47
The stored moisture in the heavy clay soil of Zababdeh even proved enough to
sustain vegetable crops. One scholar remarked, “The soil was the source of
Palestine’s wealth and had been so for ages before.”48 In years of plentiful rainfall,
the soil stored enough water that irrigation of vegetable crops was not necessary. A
Zababdeh resident named Alad stated that on his twelve dunums (three acres) of
land “[we] plant all the vegetables in the land. . . for the winter in the winter, and for
the summer in the summer. . . .And the soil will be wet, from the winter water, so it
will be enough for the vegetables in the summer.”49
Naziha recalled crops she planted on her family’s land, including “tomatoes
potatoes, peas, hummus. . . .In March [we] plant watermelon and tomatoes, potatoes,
and in the summer, other products. . . and the next year [we] plant wheat. . . Because
44
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[we] plant the land twice.”50 (See figure 2.7. Some of my interviewees told me
Zababdeh was especially known for its watermelons.51 Farmers in Zababdeh
developed their techniques to suit the conditions in which they worked, relying on
the water stored in the soil from the rainy season, and rotating their crops for
continual production each year. The crop rotation generally increases the fertility of
the land, allowing the soil a chance to replenish depleted nutrients.
Because the cereals, olive trees, tomatoes, watermelons, and all the other crops
produced in Zababdeh were completely rain-fed, the livelihood of the villagers
depended on sufficient winter rains. They produced little surplus, mostly farming
merely to feed themselves.52 Despite the obvious stress associated with such
dependence on their environment, the older generations of Zababdeh, now in their
seventies and eighties, seemed to love planting and harvesting their lands. One
Zababdeh farmer, Alad, said he and his wife worked their lands for sixty years, and
he was the best farmer in the region. He explained his success, saying “ When the
land [is yours] it will be like your son. And of course, you like your son, you love
him so much, you do everything for him.” My translator agreed, “Palestinian people
like lands so much, like their sons. They don’t like to sell any lands.”53
The people of Zababdeh developed a close connection with the land and a deep
dependence on the rainfall. Each year they awaited the rainy season hoping enough
precipitation would fall to drench the soils and fill their cisterns. Water was not
only an issue of survival for the people in Zababdeh, but also a key to their passion
of working their lands.
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Fig. 2.7: Fields of Zababdeh, divided into sections for the variety of crops grown
there.
Change in the 20th Century
Alad, Naziha, Fairuz and the rest of Zababdeh’s oldest generation all grew up
without water faucets or showers, and of course washing machines were well beyond
the realms of their imaginations. Wadia told me “all the world developed these
things in 1970s.”54 Though many of these amenities were available in other parts of
the world and even in other parts of Palestine much earlier than the 1970s, Wadia
felt her little village developed at the same pace as the rest of the world.
This development in Zababdeh, peaking around 1970, originated with some
important changes beginning around the 1950s. Once houses could be built of
concrete, the ability to store relatively clean water, cleaner than the water that ran
54
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through the dirt streets of the village, became possible. The concrete roofs (the
catchment areas) were connected by pipes to storage cisterns below the houses, as
shown in figure 2.8, so many families no longer had to fetch water from the
mountains. Wealthier families in the village installed taps in their homes in the
1970s, and the village water network was built in 1979.55 By this point, those people
whose houses were connected to the water network simply had to turn on a faucet
for water to reach them.
The water was coming from somewhere else, somewhere outside Zababdeh. The
water from the village network originated from a well many kilometers away near
the village of Arrabi, disconnecting Zababdeh from its water source. No longer
relying on a fixed amount of stored rainwater, the people of Zababdeh began using
water for more than drinking and cooking. Within a period of only twenty to thirty
years, the people of Zababdeh went from toting water several kilometers just for
drinking to washing their clothes in washing machines.
Seemingly, the constant amid the rush of change in the second half of the 20th
century was Zababdeh’s persistent practice of dry farming. Although water began
coming in pipes to the faucets in people’s houses, it was still too precious and scarce
to use it for agriculture. Farmers in the basin of Zababdeh continue to grow wheat,
durra, hummus (chickpeas), even tomatoes, and cucumbers using that same dry
farming method that has been used in the West Bank Mountains for centuries.
Even though the method of farming remained, much changed in the experience
of the people doing it. Certain crops have become less successful in Zababdeh, such
as watermelons. Ashraf explained, “Zababdeh was dependent like fifty years ago on
watermelons. . . the size of the watermelon was huge before.” Now watermelons are
rare in Zababdeh’s fields, and those that can be found are relatively small. Ashraf, a
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Fig. 2.8: Drainage pipes connecting a cement roof catchment area to the house’s
underground cistern.
water engineer, attributes decline of the watermelons in Zababdeh in part to a
“decrease in the humidity of the topsoil.” My translator Joseph observed a change
as well, relating that when he was a boy he could dig a hole in the ground even in
summer and the soil would still be wet, but now it is dry.56 Although the actual
environmental change in Zababdeh cannot be accurately measured because of the
inavailability of accurate data, Joseph’s observation suggests at least a perceived
change that affected his relationship with the land.
Evidence of a change in the relationship between Zababdeh inhabitants and
their environment is the widespread abandonment of agriculture altogether. Some
villagers, such as Alad, continued working their lands even into their 70s and 80s.
Many others, though, stopped farming much earlier. Miriam and Maria said they
56
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had been renting their twelve dunums of farmland and eighteen dunums of olive
trees, an uncommonly large landholding for Zababdeh, to Muslim families for the
past thirty years. Another Zababdeh woman said many lands in Zababdeh were
rented to Palestinian refugees. She explained that after the Israeli occupation, many
Zababdeh residents left farming for other pursuits.57 Many commuted daily to Israel
to work, and some moved even farther to places like Europe or South America.58
Employment for Zababdeh’s people diversified considerably, with people working in
factories, doing construction, or serving as nurses, policemen, or teachers, earning
substantially more than they had farming their lands.59
The abandonment of farming only increased the disconnect between Zababdeh’s
inhabitants and their land and water. The new occupations were certainly more
lucrative than farming had been, so people could afford to buy agricultural products
imported from Israel, along with other merchandise that was rare before the
occupation. They no longer had to depend on successful crops, well-fed by the rains,
to feed their families.

Conclusion
If, as George Adam Smith suggested, the “lie of the land” does indeed help
explain why “history took certain lines,” Palestine’s unique and varying geography
plays a pivotal role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The case of Zababdeh
demonstrates this importance by the changes the village’s inhabitants experienced
in their relationship with their environment primarily right after the Israeli
occupation. Zababdeh’s people had been practicing methods of water collection and
agriculture that had been used for centuries in the West Bank Mountain region.
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Around the middle of the 20th century, and most dramatically during the 1970s,
they experienced a sudden shift in their lifestyles, demonstrating the fragility of
their relationship with their environment. Modern conveniences and an improving
economy that seemingly came with the occupation created a gap between
Zababdeh’s inhabitants and their environment. They transitioned from a stark
awareness of exactly where their water supplies were coming from, how much water
they had, and how each drop was used, to being disconnected from their water
source and unaware of the quantities of water that would be available to them. This
sudden change in the fragile relationship Zababdeh’s inhabitants had with their
environment was catalyzed by a sudden change in the history of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict when Israel occupied the West Bank.
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Chapter 3
Water Policy and the Palestinians: A History of
Non-Involvement

Introduction
Access to water resources is a basic human right. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in
1948 states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing. . . ”1
Gleik claimed that although water was not specifically mentioned in this list, it was
implied as a resource necessary for adequate health and well-being.2 The United
Nations Millennium Declaration, however, specifically identified the lack of safe
drinking water as one of the “abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme
poverty.”3 Necessary for drinking, cooking, cleaning, and other aspects of day to day
life, water is vital for human survival.
Unfortunately, these conditions have not been met for many Palesitnian people.
The experience of Zababdeh’s inhabitants during the 20th century shows a
consistent pattern of water stress and scarcity. It also shows a consistent failure on
the part of the three administrations in the West Bank prior to the establishment of
1
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the Palestinian Authority, (i.e., the British, Jordanians, and Israelis), to provide a
clean, consistent, and affordable supply of water, or even acknowledge the
Palestinians’ right to it. Today, Palestinians in the West Bank do not have defined
water rights because they were not involved or included in the water policy-making
in the region over the last century. Under British, Jordanian, and Israeli
administration in the West Bank, Palestinian water rights simply were not on the
agenda. Moreover, governmental development of water resources for many West
Bank inhabitants, including those in the village of Zababdeh, did not occur.

British Mandate (1920-1948)
Just as Palestine had been a “poor and neglected part of the Ottoman Empire,”
it remained so under the new British administration.4 Palestinians in villages like
Zababdeh saw few changes in their day to day lives. According to Wadia, a
Zababdeh woman born in the 1920s, the British only passed through villages like
Zababdeh when they were traveling between the big cities, like Jenin, Ramallah,
Bethlehem, and Nablus. “They stayed there, but the village like Zababdeh, the
small village, no.”5
The British government initially retained Ottoman water law and allowed the
local customary system of regulation to persist, which centered on the regard for
water as a communal resource.6 Traditions in Palestine, primarily derived from
4
Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, updated
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5
Wadia, interview with author (Zababdeh, West Bank, 17 June 2008).
6
The customary system of water regulation was adapted and codified by the Ottoman government under the civil code “Mejelle” in the 1870s. Dante A. Caponera identified the following
procedure resulting from the civil code:
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(iii) water commissions were set up to survey and recognize established water rights;

49
Islamic law, dictate that all men have the right to use water.7 An order of priorities
determined who could use what water, when, and for what purposes. For example,
thirst was first priority, for men and then animals, no matter the water source.8
Only after thirst was quenched could water be used for domestic or irrigation
purposes. Naturally occurring bodies of water, such as lakes and rivers, were
non-saleable, but upper riparians, those nearest the headwaters, had first priority to
them. Additionally, any wells dug for the public benefit, or left by nomads,
remained available to all. But when a person dug a well himself, he owned all
irrigation rights for that well, though he still could not deny anyone that water to
drink.9 Little changed in this traditional system of water regulation when the
British took control of Palestine after World War I.
The adherance of Zababdeh’s inhabitants to Islamic law is unclear. As a
predominantly Christian village, Zababdeh differed from the surrounding villages in
more than just the greater prevalence of churches than mosques, while the rural
nature of these villages made them strikingly similar in many other ways.10 At the
(iv) land registers were compiled in order to keep a written record of duly recognized land and
water rights.
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commencement of the Mandate, Zababdeh had no natural water bodies or even
public wells, only storage cisterns; therefore, the village lacked the features around
which the Islamic customs were based.
The British Mandate for Palestine was classified as a Type A mandate charged
with rendering “administrative advice and assistance” to the communities of the
former Turkish empire “until such time as they are able to stand alone.”11 The
communities of Palestine consisted generally of the indigenous Arabs and the Jewish
population, comprised mostly of European immigrants. While the mandatory (the
British government) was supposed to encourage local autonomy and develop
self-governing institutions, British policy and other terms of the mandate
specifically aimed to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, neglecting
autonomy for the Arab Palestinians.12
In striving to realize the aspiration of a national home, Zionist leaders
throughout the Mandate attempted to secure water resources for the Jewish
communities. The “official statement of Zionist purpose” as outlined in the Basel
Declaration of the first Zionist Congress in 1897 included “the colonization of
Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.”13 A central ideal of the
Zionist movement was physical labor, working the soil of Palestine.14 While land
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acquisition took center stage in Zionist literature and lobbying efforts, water went
hand in hand with land as a necessity for the agricultural and industrial endeavors.
In a correspondence with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in 1919,
Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann asserted:
The whole economic future of Palestine is dependent on its water
supply for irrigation and electric power, and the water supply must be
from the slopes of Mount Hermon, from the headwaters of the Jordan
and the Litani River.15
The water resources identified by Weizmann comprised what he felt were a bare
minimum to sustain the numerous Jewish agricultural settlements that were
established in Palestine since the beginning of the 20th century, as well as the
streams of immigrants who hoped to arrive in the future.
Zababdeh, however, remained uninvolved. Wadia commented that people in her
village were too busy to worry about politics. “They were farmers and they were
busy. . . they would plant their lands, so they didn’t care.” She described how
horrible Turkish occupation had been, and after that the British seemed at first like
a nice reprieve. “They just left [the British] alone,” and the British left them
alone.16
Meanwhile, with British support for their cause, the Zionists were able to secure
land for the immigrants to Palestine and carry out plans to provide them with water
and electricity. Jewish engineer Pinhas Rutenberg laid out plans in 1920 to build
reservoirs and hydroelectric power stations along the Jordan River in order to
provide water for irrigating both sides of the river and to generate electricity to
supply Palestine’s “main centers of consumption of energy—that is, Jaffa, Haifa and
15
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Jerusalem.”17 By 1922, American Jews had pledged $1 million to fund Rutenberg’s
project. Although Rutenberg’s plans stalled initially, he received concessions from
the British Government and assurances that he would be allowed to exploit all the
waters of western Palestine.18 The Palestine Electric Corporation that he founded
exercised, as Rouyer put it, “a virtual monopoly over much of the Jordan basin river
system.”19
It soon became clear to the Arabs of Palestine that Britain’s policies would not
necessarily favor or benefit them. Article 11 of the Mandate for Palestine allows for
the Jewish agency to “construct or operate. . . any public works, services and
utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country.”20 No clause in
the document referenced development by any Arab Palestinian agency or
corporation. The primary recipients of the water and electricity Rutenberg’s
company produced were, of course, Jews living in Palestine. Arab Palestinians had
to build their own networks or remain without these services.
The latter was true in Zababdeh. People in the village were too poor to raise
money to build a water network. The closest they seemed to get to a municipal
water system was a “business” one family, a relatively wealthy one by Zababdeh’s
standards, created in the 1930s that used a few camels to carry water from the
mountains to the village to sell. This system lasted only until some jealous villagers,
17
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angry about paying for the water, shot the camels.21 The poor agrarian community
could not afford to sustain a business of water-toting camels, let alone establish a
complete water network from scratch. Instead, the people in Zababdeh continued
their labor-intensive system of hauling the water themselves in clay jars from the
cisterns in the mountains.
A Zababdeh woman named Fairuz commented that the British occupiers never
“made anything for Zababdeh, just taxes.”22 The lack of any development projects
in her village over the course of the Mandate indicated to Fairuz that, like the
Ottomans, the British were mostly interested in the rural inhabitants of Palestine
for taxes. Whatever taxes the villagers may have paid to the British government
never reappeared in Zababdeh’s infrastructure. While Jewish communities, often
funded by European or American donors, drank water from faucets in their houses
and flooded their fields with irrigation water, and even some Palestinian cities
managed to obtain municipal water networks, Zababdeh’s people dragged
themselves back and forth from distant mountain cisterns.

The Jordanian Administration (1948-1967)
The years between the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and the Six Day War of
1967 saw a flood of hydrologic plans and proposals for the waters of Palestine. The
tense political situation in the region meant that most of these plans were
unilateral. Jordan and Israel each began work on plans centered on increasing the
availability of water for irrigation. After the 1948 war, both countries experienced a
sharp rise in population, Israel due to renewed Jewish immigration from around the
world, and Jordan due to the influx of Palestinian refugees and the annexation of
the West Bank. In the early 1950s, each of the two countries planned projects to
21
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dam or divert waters that fed the Jordan River.23 Of course, Arab nations
passionately opposed Israel’s planned diversions of Jordan River water, and Israel
felt equally threatened by the planned Arab projects.
Although Palestinians lived along practically the entire length of the river, the
outcome of the 1948 war essentially left them without any rights to its waters.
Consequently, they were excluded from the regional hydrologic plans. For example,
negotiations for a proposal known as the Johnston Plan hosted representatives from
Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, but no representative from the stateless
Palestinians.24 Even after the Johnston negotiations collapsed, the Plan remained,
particularly to Jordan and Israel, a framework for water sharing in the region. As
architect of the plan, the United States was keen to see its success, despite its lack
of official ratification by any of the involved parties. For several years, Israel and
Jordan agreed to adhere to it in the hopes of obtaining financial support from the
US.25
According to the Plan’s specifications, the waters of the Jordan River watershed
were to be allocated as follows: 35 million cubic meters (MCM) to Lebanon, 132
MCM to Syria, and 720 MCM to Jordan, including from the groundwater within
the watershed. All residual flow from the Upper Jordan, plus 25 MCM from the
23
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Yarmouk River, would go to Israel, estimated to total 400 MCM.26 The water
allocated to Jordan was meant to cover the large Palestinian population that was
under that country’s jurisdiction at the time, but no allowance was made with
respect to a Palestinian state or any other autonomous Palestinian entity. It had to
be distributed by the Jordanian government.
As might be expected, people in Zababdeh never saw any of the Jordan River
waters allocated to the Kingdom of Jordan. Although Zababdeh was in the West
Bank, its people noticed little change under Jordanian administration than from
British rule. Fairuz’s opinion of the Jordanian government resembled her opinion of
the British: “Jordan didn’t make anything for Zababdeh. . . Just for taxes,
Jordanian and English, just for taxes. But for water, for electricity, something like
that, no.”27 The Jordanian government, like the British, failed to sponsor the
development of any infrastructure in Zababdeh, including a water network.
A Zababdeh woman I interviewed believed that the reason for Jordan’s neglect
was because the developments were not available to Jordanians either. She felt that
since Jordanians were also Arabs, they would not have any more equipment or
developments than people in Zababdeh. “If they have [it] in Jordan, they have it
here.”28
Another explanation for the lack of water development in Zababdeh during this
era could be that the Jordanian government was simply more interested in the
Jordanian people than the influx of Palestinians. This sentiment was reflected by
Nayem, a Zababdeh man that spent the first twenty years of his life under the
Jordanian administration. Like Fairuz, he commented that “the Jordanians didn’t
make anything,” for Zababdeh, or Palestinians in general.29 He thought they were
26
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only interested in helping themselves.
Even though some in Zababdeh may have been critical of the Jordanian
government’s interests, many in Zababdeh still considered Jordan’s administration
preferable to Britain’s. Wadia’s impression was that the Jordanian government was
excellent and never created problems for the Palestinians. Her family was able to
export agricultural products such as melons, olive oil, beans, and peas to
neighboring countries because the borders were open. The economy, and life in
general, was better during the Jordanian era, in her opinion.30 Miriam and Maria
agreed that life was better then because the Jordanians built a police station, so the
people were safer, and they created jobs by offering people positions in the army.31
However, Miriam and Maria also noted that “the Jordanians didn’t make
anything for water.”32 Although there were a few perceived advantages to Jordan’s
administration in the West Bank, compared to the British that is, the people of
Zababdeh continued to survive only on water stored in cisterns. Domestic water
supply fell under the jurisdiction of local municipalities and town councils, as it had
during the British Mandate.33 This may help explain why many rural villages in the
West Bank remained without water networks throughout the Jordanian era. The
Jordanian government did not take responsibility for it, and Zababdeh’s people were
too poor to establish a network themselves.
30
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Israeli Occupation (1967-present)
The outcome of the 1967 Six Day War for the Palestinians was Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These were the remaining territories
of Mandate Palestine that had been allocated for an Arab state in the 1947 UN
Partition Plan, but not annexed by Israel after the 1948 war. This development
transformed the character of the struggle for water in Palestine from a situation of
neglect to one of restriction and domination.
Israel did not annex the West Bank as Jordan had done, but “occupied” it. As
an occupied territory, the West Bank could not be subject to Israeli law, and
Jordanian laws in place at the time of occupation were to remain in force.34 Israel’s
water law, which had been passed in 1959, essentially made all water resources
public property to be managed and controlled by the state.35 In order to extend this
condition into the West Bank, along with Israeli policies on many other matters,
Israel had to pass a series of laws, including over 2000 military orders.36
Spearheading the water legislation was Israel Proclamation No. 2 of 1967, which
declared the West Bank water resources as property of the State of Israel.37
Alongside this proclamation came Israel Military Order No. 92 “Concerning Powers
for the Purpose of the Water Provisions.”38 Under this order, the Military
34
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Commander of the West Bank Area could appoint an “Officer in Charge” to hold
definitive power in all water-related decision making for the territory. Any
previously existing water provisions became null and void unless permitted to
continue under the Officer in Charge’s directive.39 For example, the Jerusalem
Water Undertaking, a company established in 1966 by the Jordanian government to
manage the water supply of the Ramallah and Al-Bireh area, was permitted to
maintain all existent facilities under their control. However, the company had only
been functioning one year at the time of the 1967 occupation, and the facilities in
some areas of its jurisdiction were under construction. The Israeli Administration in
the West Bank took control of the water facilities in these areas.40
Military Order No. 158 placed all water production facilities under Israeli
control and would require licenses for further construction or operation of water
facilities.41 Those who owned water installations like wells prior to the Israeli
occupation still had to apply for new licenses under this order.42 Additionally, No.
291 suspended and repealed aspects of Jordan’s Land and Water Settlement Law
No. 40, allowing real estate transactions to take place for land or water for which
the registration process had not yet been completed.43 Subsequent military orders
regarding agriculture and natural resources also reflected Israeli policies on water in
the region.44
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Despite the restrictive legislation on water passed by the Israeli military, most of
the people I interviewed in Zababdeh thought the period after the Israeli occupation
was the most comfortable. Many new opportunities arose for Zababdeh inhabitants
from 1967 through the 1970s and early 1980s. One of my interpreters described his
perception of the economic situation in those years, when borders between the West
Bank and Israel were open. He said that for twenty years his father and many other
men and women from the village took a taxi nearly ever day to Haifa, Nazaraeth,
Jerusalem, Afula, or another place inside Israel to work. Some people hired out for
temporary work, while others had regular jobs. “You see,” he said, “they had a
good period [when] they had the money which they didn’t have before.”45
With money flowing into Zababdeh like it never had before, other things began
flowing in too. For the first time, people there saw tractors, generators, and even a
water pump at long last. Several of my interviewees linked these new developments
directly to the Israelis. In an interview with Fairuz, my translator, who was also her
grandson, began to laugh and said, “My grandmother like Jewish so much. You
know, because Israel, they came here, they make everything for Palestine, but
especially for Zababdeh. They give electricity, they give it water, they kill the
mosquitoes, she said that. When they came here, the life became better.”46
One other very important development occurred during the 1970s. Zababdeh got
a water network. For the first time, water could be carried from outside the village
through pipes right into people’s homes. According to a municipality council
member, the network was established by Oxfam in 1979.47 My translator recounted:
45
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“I remember these days, when I was ten years. And I remember when they started
to put the pipes the first time, in Zababdeh. It’s in 70s, in 1978 or 1979. I
remember when I was a little boy I was standing with them, [and they were] digging
beside the street.”48
Since Zababdeh had no well to provide water for the village, the water for the
distribution network had to come from somewhere else.
Providing water to the West Bank was the responsility of the West Bank Water
Department. The WBWD delivered drinking water to municipalities and village
councils for distribution to the Palestinian population. Established under the
Natural Resource Authority of Jordan, the WBWD and all other civilian
institutions in the West Bank initially fell under the authority of the Area
Commander.49 In 1981, certain powers of the Israeli military in the West Bank were
transferred to Israel’s Civilian Administration for the occupied territories. In the
Military Order establishing it, the Civilian Administration was tasked with
administer[ing] the civilian affairs in the region, in accordance with
the directives of this order, for the well-being and good of the population
and in order to supply and implement the public services, and taking
into consideration the need to maintain an orderly administration and
public order in the region.50
The Civilian Administration was essentially created to handle non-military matters
in the West Bank. Consequently, the Civilian Administration supervised the
WBWD and water distribution in the West Bank.
Under the Civilian Administration, the WBWD had little power. It was
responsible for delivering water throughout the West Bank, but had no
48
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decision-making abilities and did not participate in water planning.51 Although
staffed by Palestinians, the WBWD still signified direct Israeli control over water
resources and distribution.
The West Bank’s municipalities and village councils lay under the thumb of the
Israeli occupiers as well. These authorities were responsible for delivering water to
the inhabitants within their jurisdiction, whether from water supplied by the
WBWD, which had to be purchased (usually from Mekerot, the Israeli water
company), or from the few wells they were permitted by the Israeli administration
to retain after the occupation.52 Initially, Zababdeh’s water came from one of these
wells near a village called Arraba. Then in 1981, the Israeli government drilled a
well on some land between Zababdeh and the nearby town of Qabatiya.53 According
to a farmer, Bilal, on whose land the Qabatiya well resided, it was drilled to supply
the Israeli military camp on the outskirts of the village, as well as some Israeli
settlements that had been built on the other side of Zababdeh.54 Consequently, the
pipes from this well carried water through Zababdeh, giving the villagers the
opportunity to purchase water from a closer and more reliable source. “And what
they have after they use, if they have more, they started to send it to the villages
around here.”55
A few years before my 2008 interviews, the Israeli military deserted the camp.
Bilal reported that until that time he was forbidden from coming to his land. He
was not recompensed in any way for the use of his land or the water coming from
51
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underneath it. He commented that he was the owner paying for water from his own
land.56
The supply of water to Zababdeh was not completely reliable. One interviewee
remembered 1985 and 1986 to be especially dry years, so most of the water from the
well was used by the Israelis before it could come to Zababdeh. Of course, the
Israelis also often cut water to the village when people had not paid for it.57
Especially during the years of the first intifada, from 1987 until 1993, the water to
the village was often cut for days or weeks.58 When water to the village was cut,
people relied on their back-up cisterns that used to be their primary source of water.
These dried up during the hot Palestine summers, at which time Zabadeh’s
inhabitants had to purchase the contaminated but very expensive water brought to
the village in water tankers.
Although Zababdeh’s inhabitants saw many improvements in their lives under
Israeli administration, the occupiers were no saviors to the people of Zababdeh. One
of my translators remarked, “Israel is a curse and a blessing in the same time,
because [we are] getting better with money now, and a curse because it’s an
occupation.”59 When the borders were open between the West Bank and Israel,
people could earn many times what they were used to.60 However, the Israeli
military could close the borders any time, and often did so, especially after the start
of the intifada in 1987. Additionally, the Israeli government in the West Bank
showed no more interest in developing water resources for Zababdeh than the
British or Jordanians had. The water network that appeared during this era was
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not a development project by the Israeli military or the Civilian Administration,
but came from an outside source.61 Because Israel controlled the source of water for
this network, the water to Zababdeh could be cut any time at the discretion of the
Israelis. The situation for Zababdeh’s inhabitants consequently remained unstable.

Palestinian Authority (1995-present)
The peace negotiations of the early 1990s between Israel and Palestinian leaders
brought the Palestinian struggle for water into the political discussion. The water
issue made an appearance in the agreement known as Oslo I, under the principle of
economic growth. This section of the peace accords called for the creation of a
Palestinian water authority, among a list of other economy-related authorities. Also,
the Israelis and Palestinians agreed to cooperate on economic issues, including
water. Experts from both sides would create a Water Development Program
comprised of “proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well
as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and
beyond the interim period.”62 This clause demonstrates only one of the many issues
in the document over which the two parties were not prepared or willing to sign a
specific agreement. No rights were actually defined; instead, the document only
called for “studies and plans” on the matter. This situation characterized the era of
the Palestinian Authority’s administration in the West Bank until the present day.
Palestinian and Israeli negotiators debated the issues of Oslo I for another two
years before signing the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
61
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known as Oslo II, on 28 September 1995. By this time, (limited) control of Jericho
and the Gaza Strip had been turned over to the Palestinians, and members of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) were sworn in to govern them.63 Part of the “civil
powers and responsibilities” transferred to the Palestinian Authority in certain areas
of the West Bank under the terms of Oslo II included, as explained in Article 40 of
Annex 5, “powers and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage in the West
Bank related solely to Palestinians.”64 Under this clause, the Palestinians were
granted the authority to manage their own water resources, those within the areas
now under direct PA administration. The Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) was
established in 1995, a commissioner was appointed to handle water management for
the Palestinians, and Palestinians and Israelis agreed to share water data with one
another.65
Water problems in Zababdeh did not disappear with the creation of the PWA,
though. The village continued to get its water from the Qabatiya well, which was
owned by Israel’s water company Mekorot.66 Zababdeh’s water supply from the well
continued to be cut for long periods of time, especially in the summer when the
water table was lower and the well less productive. People in the village often had
to purchase tanks of water brought from other places.67
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When the soldiers at the Israeli military camp outside Zababdeh were
redeployed, the Qabatiya well was turned over to the PWA. It was reportedly in a
dismal condition, the pump under disrepair and the water table almost too low to
pump from anymore. When I visited the location of the well, Bilal told me it
stopped working in 2006. A new one was being built adjacent to the old one, but
was awaiting funding from international donors (at least one million dollars,
according to Bilal) before it could supply water to the region again.68
In the meantime, Zababdeh’s water supply was coming from the Arraba well
approximately eleven kilometers away. According to a municipality council member
named Abed, water from the Arraba well only came to Zababdeh after it provided
for all the villages in its own area.69 Consequently, the people in Zababdeh still
suffered periods of days or weeks without water. Moreover, when water did reach
the Zababdeh water network, oftentimes the pressure was too low to reach all areas
of the village. One woman told me that her house, which was on a mountain in
Zababdeh, never got water from the network because the pressure was low. “So
without the water, they pump the air inside the pipe. So when the air comes, the
counter receives just air.”70 Abed reported that many people complained to the
municipality about this problem. The municipality would tell them they could
either pay their bill even if all they received was air, or they could cut off their
service from the municipality, which was very expensive to start again. Abed
admitted that the total amount in bills from Zababdeh inhabitants was more than
the bill the municipality received from the PWA.71
A more reliable water source than the defunct Qabatiya well or the
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over-committed Arraba well might have solved the water problems of Zababdeh’s
people and municipality. However, money to drill or repair a well was not the only
stumbling block they faced. A limiting factor of the transfer of authority to
Palestinians under Oslo II lay in the “coordination” called for in the agreement. An
equal number of representatives from the Palestinians and the Israelis were to form
the Joint Water Committee (JWC). Under this principal of the agreement, all
decisions regarding water and sewage had to be reached by consensus of the JWC,
meaning both Palestinians and Israelis had to sign off on them. The types of
decisions included approval for drilling new wells or increasing pumping level from a
water source, as well as decreasing extraction from a source, and construction or
modification of water or sewage infrastructure. Decisions by the JWC would be
enforced by a number of Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETs), each
composed of at least two personnel from each side.72
In a practical sense, this joint approval required for any water projects meant
that despite the degree of autonomy granted to the Palestinians on the issue, the
Israeli government could still prevent the legal development of water resources by
Palestinians. Indeed, most of the wells drilled after 1995 were shallow illegal wells.73
These are always at risk of being closed off by Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
One of my translators believed that deeper wells were even more disconcerting to
Israel. He said, “You know why it’s not allowed to dig deeper than Israel? Because
if you dig deeper than Israel, you will draw all the water from them.”74 To him,
Israel prevented the Palestinians from drilling deeper, more productive wells
because it would decrease the amount of water available to Israelis.
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Conclusion
The agreement signed in 1995 represented monumental progress in negotiating
peace in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and opened the door to a realization of
Palestinian water rights. However, just as the rest of the interim agreement was
laced with the phrase “except for the issues that will be negotiated in the
permanent status negotiations,” the final details of the water issue were left for later
negotiations. While the first principle of Article 40 indicates Israel’s recognition
that the Palestinians do indeed have water rights, it omits an explanation of what
those rights are, instead leaving the matter for the permanent status negotiations.
The next few years saw a breakdown in the peace process. Few compromises were
reached after the Interim Agreement, and despite numerous efforts to settle them,
the more sensitive issues left out of the earlier accord have not been resolved.
Distrust between the two sides in the dispute heightened with each new failed
attempt at a solution. The final status issues, including the highly contentious
water problem, have proven very stubborn obstacles to peace.
The Palestinians are now in a very weak negotiating position with regards to
water. This weak position can be traced to their history of non-involvement with
the issue. While the British Mandate era in Palestine saw numerous efforts by the
Zionists to secure water resources for a future state, the Palestinian Arabs made few
attempts, and consequently little progress, in acquiring more water for their
population than rainfall. A generally rural and relatively poor group of people, the
Palestinians lacked the capital and the technical expertise that the Jewish colonists
had access to, not to mention the political influence with the British government.
While the West Bank was an annexed territory of Jordan, no plans were made to
allocate water to a future Palestinian state. People in Zababdeh indicated they
thought the Jordanian government was primarily interested in Jordanians. The
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Israeli administration in the West Bank placed strict regulations on Palestinian
development of water resources, preventing villages like Zababdeh from improving
their water situation themselves.
While the Oslo Accords allowed for the establishment of a water authority in
Palestine, the Palestinian government must still pass all plans and decisions under
Israeli scrutiny for final approval. Moreover, the two sides of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict have thus far been unable to agree upon the water rights of the Palestinian
people and what resources should be reserved for them. Although water has finally
taken its place with the other issues crucial to the future of a Palestinian state, the
Palestinians remain displaced from the policy and decision making regarding the
scarce resource.
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Chapter 4
The Absence of Water Wars in Palestine

Introduction
As access to clean water has increasingly become a problem for people in the
world, the argument that conflicts will be fought over the resource seems more and
more plausible. The land of Palestine is often a prominent subject for predictions of
looming water wars, although evidence of such wars and their likelihood in the
future has been widely debated. This chapter offers an explanation for the absence
of violent conflict over water in Palestine by exploring the water history in
Zababdeh, the history of the village’s struggle throughout the 20th century to
acquire water for the people’s basic needs. The inhabitants of Zababdeh
experienced drastic improvements to the ways they accessed and used water under
Israeli occupation, compared to the years before it, leaving them little incentive to
fight over the resource. But as the older generations in the village age and pass on,
the younger generations that grew up under the occupation see injustice and
inequality in the water distribution in the West Bank.

Water Wars Theory
Of the wars fought as part of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, none can be
classified exclusively as “water wars.” John Cooley asserts that a struggle for water
was “a principal cause” of the Six Day War in 1967. In the mid-1960s, Arab
governments laid plans to divert waters of the Jordan River in response to the
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construction of the Israeli National Water Carrier. Israel responded to the plans
with an airstrike at the diversion site.1 While the incident very likely contributed to
the 1967 war, it was not, in and of itself, a war. Similarly, Hussein Amery supported
the claim that water scarcity was a reason for the first intifada.2 Again, water is not
the primary cause of the conflict, but according to the author, it is a contributing
factor. These are two of the few instances in which water is directly associated with
a war in Palestine, though it is still not the primary cause for war.
All other points of tension over water in these articles, as well as a similar article
by Joyce Starr,3 are treated as potential sources of violent conflict. After describing
some of the tension between Israel and its neighbors regarding the region’s rivers,
attributing most of the blame to Israel for diverting Jordan River water, Cooley
called for Israel to publicly declare to its Arab neighbors that it does not intend to
seize their water. In turn the Arab countries must offer “assurances” to Israel, while
the United States should firmly stick to its policies of interstate cooperation over
water in the region in order to avoid a “new war over Mideast resources.”4 Amery
analyzed an incident between Israel and Lebanon that “almost prompted military
blows.”5 In 2001, Lebanon began building a pumping station on a little spring that
fed one of the upper tributaries of the Jordan River, which met with a “certain
public hysteria” in Israel.6 Although the incident did not actually lead to military
action, Amery also warned that, in the absence of cooperative action, a violent
conflict could ensue. A large section of Starr’s article on Middle East water wars
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focused on Palestine, specifically the dispute over water resources between the state
of Israel and the Palestinians. She warned that the failure to solve the problem of
water scarcity would preclude final peace agreements.7
A major concern, according to Starr, is the allocation of water between Israelis
and Palestinians. In 1991, Israel stretched its water resources 15-20% beyond the
natural replenishment rate. Most of the water extracted went toward agriculture.
While Israeli agriculture drains the aquifers and river in the region, Palestinians are
refused sufficient water for agriculture. The Palestinians pump some water from
wells (though only pre-1967 ones) and purchase water from Israel. This water is
almost solely for Palestinian domestic, and some industrial, use, which combined is
less per capita than the domestic use of anyone living in Israel. Additionally, Starr
points out that the Palestinians have no decision-making power over water
resources.8
Yet Starr, like Cooley and Amery, only warns of the potential for the “critical
situation” to erupt. Despite the clearly frustrating and inequitable situation the
Palestinians are in, little if any violence has resulted. A look at the history of
Palestinian water access and usage in the village of Zababdeh gives some
explanation for why the clearly sensitive and volatile issue has not become a driver
of the conflict.

Zababdeh’s Water History
For centuries, methods of water collection in Palestine, particularly the
mountain region, consisted largely only of storing rainwater in cisterns. The
tradition of collecting winter rains to sustain people through the dry summer season
continued with seemingly little change through to the 20th century. Cisterns dug
7
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during the British Mandate era often were dug by the same backbreaking manual
labor that had been used in ancient times.9 A man in Zababdeh, Abu Jilal,
described hewing a cistern in the limestone rock using only “simple tools,”
remembering his father carrying stones from the cistern on his back. He explained
the pulley system they used to remove these large stones:
They were digging this [cistern]. . . they were making a wood-like
circle, making the rope going around it while they are pulling the soil, or
the rocks from inside the [cistern], to take them out. . . They [took] three
months to dig the well, the whole summer to finish the well. . . 10
The digging of cisterns was often a communal effort, involving the whole family or
even multiple families working together to dig cisterns big enough to store water for
their families all summer long.11
Cisterns initially were built on family-owned land several kilometers from the
village, far from the filthy streets of the village (see figure 4.1). The families that
owned these cisterns regularly cleaned them very thoroughly in the fall, just before
the rainy season. They cleared any debris from the area around the cistern and
sometimes put lime around the area to keep it clean.12
The women of the villages typically collected water for their families, hiking up
the hills to draw water from the cisterns. This incessant task had to be performed
every day, sometimes multiple times a day. A Zababdeh woman, Rosa, remarked
that three trips to the cistern would suffice her family of four children plus two
parents for one day.13 Old and young women, responsible for bringing the water,
balanced large clay jars on their heads, gliding along with incredible skill. The
9
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Fig. 4.1: A mountain cistern in the West Bank near Qalqilya, like those in the mountains of Zababdeh.
water was drawn from the cistern in buckets and poured into the jars, like the one
in figure 4.2, used for transporting and storing the water in people’s homes. Two or
three related families usually shared a cistern built on their lands. Women had to
walk to the particular cistern owned by their families, often several kilometers from
their homes and at the top of big hills.14
After the effort exerted for just one of these bottles of water, it was something to
be handled carefully and in moderation. Abu Jilal commented:
14
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Fig. 4.2: A Zababdeh woman with a jar formerly used to carry water from the
mountain cisterns.
[I] never washed [my] face with clean water until [I] reached twenty
years old. . . [We] don’t want to waste the clean water [for washing], so [I]
was using the dirty water for the animals. . . that’s what [I] was using to
wash [my] face.15
No drop of the clean mountain rainwater could be wasted for even such an ordinary
task as washing one’s face. Each drop had to be carefully guarded. Even Abu Jilal
remembered his father sleeping sometimes near their cistern to prevent women from
other families coming to take water because their cistern was closer to the village.16
For everyone in Zababdeh and many rural parts of Palestine, water was a central
focus of their day, as they labored to acquire enough of it for survival.
15
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Although Palestinians built very large cisterns meant to store water for the entire
year, sometimes after several months of the hot Palestine summers, the cisterns went
dry. At such times, many women would have to wander in search of more water.17
An eighty-one year old Zababdeh woman named Fairuz recalled a summer when
she was thirteen or fourteen years old and she went with some other girls to collect
water from a cistern. When the bucket came out of the cistern empty, the girls tied
a rope around Fairuz’s body and lowered her into the dark shaft. She reached the
bottom only to discover that it was indeed dry. Similarly, they checked twelve more
cisterns nearby, with the same result. Because it did not rain for another one or two
months, the girls then had to travel thirteen or fourteen kilometers to the city of
Jenin in search of water.
Other Zababdeh women had similar experiences. Sharif remembered going with
her family from village to village in search of water. In one village, they had an
argument with the townspeople over water and had to go many kilometers farther
before they found water.18 Hani related an instance when she arrived at the cistern,
but because many other people had just drawn from it, she found it empty. So she
went with some neighbors to a nearby village to take water from a large cistern
owned by a very rich man. For some reason, the man refused to let Hani draw water
from his cistern, and she went home empty-handed. That night, to her good
fortune, it rained.19
Often if all the cisterns in the nearby villages became dry, women had to walk
many miles farther in search of springs. Though springs became less productive as
the summer wore on, they typically provided water longer and more consistently
than the cisterns. Cisterns rely directly on the previous rainy season for
17
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replenishment. But spring water emerges from the underground aquifers that store
water from many rainy seasons. Several years of low rainfall certainly affect spring
flow, since the aquifers also regenerate from precipitation that seeps into them.
While the flow of a spring can greatly decrease after a few dry years, or the spring
might even dry up, nevertheless, in general most springs continue to flow when the
cisterns have been desiccated.
Fairuz and Sharif both recalled trekking the thirteen or so kilometers to Jenin in
search of its plentiful springs. Sharif recounted:
[We] would go, like, groups of people, and [we] took donkeys with
[us]. And [we] were holding [the jars on our] heads and hands [in order
to bring water back here], just for drinking. And that lasts for two days.
And [we] have to go the next day to search again.20
In drought years, Zababdeh and other similar villages of the northern West Bank
were obliged to search out the springs of other cities and villages like Jenin,
Qabatiya, and Nablus. Though normally only the women hiked the one or two
kilometers to the cisterns in the hills, a dry year might require the entire family to
walk fifteen kilometers to gather as much water as possible from a spring.
The water collected from the springs and cisterns provided nearly the entire
domestic water supply for rural Palestine.21 After the toil put into acquiring a few
liters of water, it is little wonder water was used by Palestinians almost solely for
domestic purposes during the early 20th century.
Despite the British Administration’s plans and intentions for development in
Palestine, little changed for the Palestinians throughout the entire Mandate Era.
While Palestinians had begun to be exposed to unfamiliar technologies and
20
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materials during this era, the rural people often were too poor to buy any of it.
Fairuz recalled moving from Zababdeh to the nearby city of Jenin in 1959,
remarking that all the houses had “taps,” indoor plumbing, in the city. “Because
Jenin was a city,” she said, “so they had the water there continuously, and the
bathroom was inside the house. But in Zababdeh, no.” The little village remained
without such amenities.
However, the end of the Mandate era through the Jordanian period saw the
advent of concrete in many Zababdeh homes instead of the “mud” used before. This
development brought a remarkable innovation: cisterns below the houses (see figure
4.3). Though the concept itself was not entirely new, the purpose for which these
cisterns were used changed. During the decades before, any cisterns found within
the village, in the streets, next to or inside houses, only fed livestock. Saliba and his
wife Rosa recounted: “The water for animals and for [cleaning] the houses [was in
cisterns] here inside the house. And you know because the water came for this
[cistern] from the street, it was so dirty.”22 Because the streets of Zababdeh were
only dirt paths and the houses were made from clay before the 1950s, any water
that drained into the cisterns of the village was filthy.
With concrete houses, and consequently concrete cisterns, people could store
drinking water right inside their houses. Abu Jilal said:
So [we] knew about concrete. . . We started to make our roofs and the
ceiling from concrete. Now it’s clean, it’s not of mud or something like
that. Now it’s clean, and [we] started also to make the [cisterns] inside
from concrete to keep the water clean. . . Every four years [we] were
cleaning the [cistern]. . . because when [winter comes], [we] have to store
the clean water inside.23
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Fig. 4.3: Concrete cisterns like this one have been built to store rainwater under
houses in Zababdeh since the 1950s.
Some of my interviewees explained that the transition to cisterns below their
houses occurred specifically after 1948 because refugees from the first Arab-Israeli
war passed through Zababdeh and often washed their clothes in the mountain
cisterns, contaminating the water.24 Once the cisterns were under the houses,
rainwater collected on the concrete rooftops that tilted slightly toward pipes leading
to the cisterns where it could be stored. Before the rainy season, families had to
clean any debris from the roof catchment area, and they scrubbed the cisterns so
the water would be as clean as possible.
24
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The daily trek to the mountains Zababdeh women used to make became a thing
of the past. Once the houses in Zababdeh could store clean water, the cisterns that
dotted the surrounding hills became merely back-ups. Still, the system of drawing
the water out by a rope and bucket remained. A Zababdeh man named Nayem
described his house during the 1950s and 1960s, with a jug in the corner keeping the
water drawn from the cistern cool if they wanted a drink. “And the place for a
bathroom was far away, but it was just a hole in the ground, and [there was] no
water.”25 One of my translators, noting that he was born in 1969, remembered
drawing water from his family cistern using a rope and bucket.26 Although an
important step, the concrete houses with indoor cisterns were only a small
development that did little to ameliorate the overall problem of water scarcity in the
village.
The big changes in Zababdeh came during the 1970s, after the West Bank had
fallen under Israeli occupation. Even more technologies appeared in the village.
Zababdeh saw electricity for the first time in the early 1970s when an Italian priest
coordinated with some European organizations to establish a network there.27
Farmers began using tractors and other farm equipment, finally able to purchase
such things because they made more money selling to the Israelis than they had
before.28 People also purchased small pumps to pump water from their cisterns to
tanks on the roofs of their houses (see figure 4.4), so it could then come out of the
new taps they also installed in their houses.29
During this time, as Fairuz commented, “water comes from two sources: from
raining, on the roof and down the pipes to the [cistern], and the second sources is
25
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Fig. 4.4: Rooftop water storage tanks on top of an apartment building in Nablus.
from tanks.”30 When the cisterns that collected rain from the roofs of houses dried
up, people had to purchase water from other places, brought to the village in
tractor-drawn water tankers like the one in figure 4.5.
Eventually, Zababdeh got a water network. Many lifestyle changes took place as
a result of the water network. Other methods of acquiring water were
labor-intensive and costly. Only a short time before construction of the network,
women had stopped going to the mountains for water. Instead, the water was
collected on the roofs of cement houses and stored in cisterns underneath the houses,
both of which had to be meticulously cleaned often. Additionally, the cisterns might
dry up after a long, hot summer. In such a case, water was purchased from wells in
30

Fairuz, see n. 17.
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Fig. 4.5: A water tanker used to bring water to Zababdeh from wells and springs in
other cities and villages.
other villages and brought to Zababdeh in tankers. This was only a last resort
because it was very expensive. The water pumped into the village through the
network, however, proved much more affordable and required little, if any, effort.
Once the water coming into the village became cheaper and seemed more
reliable, people in Zababdeh purchased amenities that had perhaps before seemed
too expensive or wasteful to them. Many houses began to see showers, washing
machines, and indoor toilets.31 As water became more accessible to the people of
Zababdeh, their demand for it increased. Rosa commented, “We consume today per
day like a month in the past.”32 The older generation, Rosa, Abu Jilal, Fairuz,
31

Miriam and Maria, interview with author (Zababdeh, West Bank, 16 June 2008); Nayem, see

n. 25.
32

Rosa and Saliba, see n. 13.
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Sharif, and the others, saw many improvements to their quality of life during the
Israeli occupation, and perhaps in no way more so than their water usage.
Whatever attitudes they have about the occupation, and even though it is
debatable whether Israel’s influence or involvement in the West Bank directly led to
any of these improvements, they all agree that their day to day lives became easier
after the occupation commenced.
However, not all of Zababdeh’s inhabitants remember the time when water had
to be hauled into their mud houses in jars. The younger people in the village grew
up with showers and toilets in their houses. The comparisons they make are with
what they observe in their lifetimes.
Although since the 1980s, water could be pumped directly to people’s houses
and purchased through their municipality for a relatively cheap price,33 the network
did not turn out quite like the people of Zababdeh had hoped. The Qabatiya well
supplying the water to Zababdeh’s network, shown in 4.6, like the Arraba well that
supplied Zababdeh before it, did not exclusively serve the people of Zababdeh.
While it was more reliable than the water from far away in Arraba, Zababdeh only
received water after the Qabatiya well had fed the military camp and any Israeli
settlements that took water from it. In winter, when the water table was high,
Zababdeh’s network had water nearly every day. But in the summertime, the
productivity of the well decreased and water to the village could be cut off for
weeks. When the network water was cut, Zababdeh again had to rely on the water
from their house cisterns or purchase water from tankers. Cistern water had to be
carefully rationed in order to sustain a family through the summer. Often this
meant fewer showers, or people might choose not to wash their clothes. While the
situation may have been similar to a few years before when there was no water
33

Mayor of Zababdeh Municipality, interview with author (Zababdeh, West Bank, 15 June
2008).
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network, it still led to serious hygiene problems. The water from the tankers, which
cost at least three times as much as that from the network,34 could also only be
used sparingly. Besides being more expensive than the network water, it was also
much dirtier, presenting even more health risks for Zababdeh.
One solution to these problems might have been to drill another well to supply
Zababdeh. When the Israelis dug the Qabatiya well, people near Zababdeh had the
opportunity to observe the technologies and processes used in drilling wells. Bilal,
the man on whose land the Qabatiya well sits, explained how he built a drill using
an old truck. Before the Israelis dug the well, he did not realize what lay below his
lands. My translator commented, “They didn’t buy outside from Israel. No. They
did it. People here are smart. They can do it.”35
Several obstacles still stood in the way of the people in Zababdeh tapping into
the aquifer water. Just as the land around Zababdeh was not well-suited to springs,
any wells there had to be dug much deeper than even those in neighboring Qabatiya
and would likely be much less productive. Once a well was drilled, it would need a
pump and fuel to run that pump, a large expense for people of Zababdeh.
But the greatest obstacle to water acquisition were the Israeli restrictions on
drilling wells and pumping from them. The Israeli Military Orders issued in 1967
and 1968 nationalized all water resources in the newly occupied territories, fixed
pumping quotas, invalidated any previous water settlements, and established a
strict permit system for any proposed drilling of new wells.36 Such permits were
rarely issued to Palestinians. In much of the West Bank, people drilled numerous
illegal wells, which proved inefficient. According to Ihab Bargouthi at the
34

Abed, Zababdeh municipal council member, interview with author (Zababdeh, West Bank, 19
June 2008). While the specific prices he mentioned in the interview were current to 2008, the ratios
would have been much the same twenty years earlier.
35
Bilal, interview with author (Zababdeh, West Bank, 1 June 2008).
36
Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem, from email correspondence with Jane Hilal, Water and
Environment Research Chair (22 April 2008).
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Fig. 4.6: The Qabatiya well, which has supplied water to Zababdeh’s water network,
though irregularly, since 1981.
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), the Jenin area probably has around 130 illegal
wells.37 These are usually quite shallow, less than 100 meters compared to the
sometimes 800-meter deep wells owned by the PWA. With so many unregulated
wells pumping from the same aquifers, in addition to water pumped from the
aquifer by Israeli companies, productivity of many wells has become very irregular
due to fluctuations and decreasing levels in the water table. Consequently, the
already inconsistent flow of water supplied through networks like Zababdeh’s has
only become more unreliable.
In the meantime, Zababdeh is growing, expanding more and more into the
surrounding hills (see figure 4.7). On the rare occasions that the village’s
37

Bilal, see n. 35.

85
municipality obtains water for its citizens, the pressure is often so low that the
water cannot reach the higher elevations, so the new houses in the hills experience
even more difficulty than the rest of the village in receiving water through the
network.38 Additionally, though the Oslo Accords of 1995 transferred ownership of
the Qabatiya well to the Palestinian Authority, Zababdeh once again has had to
purchase water from much more distant wells like Arraba to supply the network. In
2006, the Qabatiya well quit working, and the Palestinian Authority had to seek aid
from European countries in order to repair it.39 Water from Arraba seldom comes to
Zababdeh in the pipes, leaving the people sometimes weeks without water in the
network from their municipality. Once all the rainwater in their cisterns has been
used, nearly all of the approximately 1,000 houses in Zababdeh must purchase filthy
water from the tankers.

The Gap
The situation in Zababdeh and other Palestinian West Bank communities may
be, and often is, compared with the perception of life in Israel or the West Bank
Israeli settlements. Juxtaposing the lifestyle of Israelis with Palestinians has become
a popular tool in arguing for Palestinian water rights. Alwyn Rouyer titled an
article on the subject “Basic Needs vs. Swimming Pools” to highlight the severity of
the gap.40 Although numbers vary of exactly how much water the Israeli West Bank
settlers consume, most sources agree that it is many times more than the West
Bank Palestinians receive. One statistic put the settlers’ daily per capita
consumption at 74 gallons and Palestinians at 18.5, compared to the World Health
38

Alad, see n. 28, comment by a relative.
Bilal, see n. 35; Abed, see n. 34.
40
Alwyn Rouyer, “Basic Needs vs. Swimming Pools: Water Inequality and the Palestinian-Israeli
Conflict,” Middle East Report, no. 227 (Summer 2003): 2–7, url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/
1559317 (accessed Oct. 18, 2010).
39
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Fig. 4.7: Zababdeh sprawl. As Zababdeh’s population grows, the houses spread
farther and farther into the surrounding countryside.
Organization’s minimum standard of 26.5.41
Israeli lifestyle with swimming pools, green lawns, and carwashes contrasts
sharply with Palestinian water shortages just for drinking, bathing, and cleaning
their houses. In 1995, an Israeli TV station aired a program depicting this contrast
between the Jewish settlement of Kiryat Arba and the nearby Palestinian city of
Hebron. The uproar in Israel proper prompted Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to
order water to be trucked from the settlement to Hebron. The Washington Report
on Middle East Affairs reported: “A total of 27 cubic meters of water were brought
in, literally a drop in the bucket compared with the city’s [Kiryat Arba’s] daily
41

William A. Orme Jr., “In West Bank, Water Is as Touchy as Land,” The New York Times
(15 July 2000), url: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/15/world/in-west-bank-water-isas-touchy-as-land.html (accessed Aug. 6, 2009).
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consumption under normal conditions of 25,000 cubic meters of water per day.”42
The inequitable distribution of water alone is not the sole problem that has
plagued Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. Often the water reaching
particularly small villages is of inferior quality. One woman from the village of
Faqua, after her son became ill with chronic diarrhea, said, ”I’m angry that my son
is sick. The doctor says it’s because of the water. We buy it from outside. I don’t
know where it comes from. I give it to my children even though I know it’s
contaminated. What else can I do?”43
Zababdeh suffers a similar situation when purchasing water from tankers, but
sometimes the water that comes through pipes from the city is not much better.
Abed, a city council member in Zababdeh, explained that when no water is flowing
through the pipes, they begin to rust. Then when water again comes through the
village network, it carries with it the rust particles into people’s faucets. To this,
village resident Joseph responded jokingly, “Zababdeh is the only place you have to
use a toothpick after drinking the water.”44

Conclusion
The challenges the little village of Zababdeh faces today differ significantly from
those it faced one hundred years ago, or even just fifty. Over the course of the 20th
century, Zababdeh grew from a rather isolated little village of about 200 or 300
people in uneducated farming families to a community of nearly 4000 individuals,
many of whom speak English, drive cars, and have satellite dishes on their roofs.
Instead of sending all the village women to the mountains three or four times a day
42
Frank Collins, “Israeli Refusal to Yield Control of West Bank Water Forces Deferral of Issue,”
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (October/November 1995): 13,19.
43
Katya Adler, “Water shortages plague West Bank,” BBC News (7 July 2009), url: http:
//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8141771.stm (accessed Mar. 6, 2010).
44
Abed, see n. 34, with comment from translator.
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to tote water back home in large, awkward urns, people in Zababdeh now build
huge cement cisterns below their houses and boast a water network system that
reaches nearly every house.
However, many of the developments that improved the water situation in the
village since the 1930s have essentially been canceled out by other changes that
impeded the village’s progress. Technologies that appeared in Zababdeh during the
1970s, sometimes through the generosity of international donors, including water
pumps and the network established throughout the village, were quickly followed by
washing machines, indoor toilets, and showers. All these new amenities increased
water consumption by Zababdeh’s inhabitants. As technology to drill wells became
available to some rural Palestinians, they found their ability to drill was limited by
the occupying government. The many wells that have been drilled and overexploited
by both Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank have lowered the water table,
causing many springs to dry up and older wells to quit or decrease productivity.
Although lifestyles and technologies have changed, concern and stress over water
have remained. The improvements in the lives of Zababdeh’s people seem to have
mitigated the potential for violent conflict over water in the village. However, the
starkly evident consumption gap between Palestinians and Israelis can only heighten
tensions between the two groups. The older generations of Zababdeh may recall the
tedious and difficult lifestyles of their youth, but the younger generations’ memories
begin with Israeli occupation and restrictions on their water access and use. Their
lifestyles have not been improving through the years of occupation and the injustice
of their water situation has become increasingly apparent. Water wars may not have
taken place in Palestine thus far, nor may they ever, but the tension surrounding
the water issue will remain a barrier between Palestinians and Israelis, preventing
peace, until the injustice has been righted.

89

Chapter 5
Conclusion
Understanding the water problem at the ground level in Palestine, in a case
study like that of Zababdeh, can help people to understand why water has achieved
recent prominence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and can help negotiators, water
management experts, and policy-makers to devise solutions to the water problem in
Palestine. The village’s experience with water over the 20th century illustrates an
underlying, and even sometimes an overt, stress that has been exacerbating conflict
in Palestine for decades.
In Palestine, a naturally water-scarce region, water stress is inherent. Over
thousands of years, the region’s inhabitants adapted their lifestyles to the unique
climate and geography of Palestine, developing methods of collecting, storing, and
transporting water. The shifting political conditions during the latter half of the
20th century and an accompanying influx of technology altered the relationship
between Zababdeh’s inhabitants and their environment. The rather sudden and
drastic change in their daily water habits created a disconnect between people and
environment that ultimately has altered these people’s perceptions of the role of
water in their lives.
By the 1980s, Zababdeh’s inhabitants were using water for more than merely
drinking and cooking. As Rosa mentioned, “We consume [water] today per day like
a month in the past.”1 People began using water to clean their houses, take regular
showers, and wash their clothes in a washing machine. They no longer had to haul
1

Rosa [and Saliba], interview by author, Zababdeh, West Bank, 19 June 2008.
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jars of water to their homes from far away places; it could come through pipes right
into their kitchen taps. None of these things seem like opulence or luxury to many
people in developed countries. Yet these amenities only became available in
Zababdeh during the last thirty years.
I ascribe to the philosophy of a human right to water, that “all peoples,
whatever their stage of development and their social and economic conditions, have
the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to
their basic needs.”2 For the Palestinians, this right was ignored for decades. None of
the administrations in the West Bank prior to the 1990s looked at providing clean
and safe water to Palestinian communities as a priority. The village of Zababdeh
saw no government-sponsored water projects throughout the British Mandate,
Jordanian administration, or Israeli occupation. Despite the creation of the
Palestinian Water Authority in 1995, whose very existence is to manage Palestine’s
water resources, many Palestinian communities like Zababdeh still lack a water
supply “of good quality for personal consumption at costs they can afford.”3 The
water in Zababdeh’s network has always been erraticly delivered and of poor
quality. When no water flows in the network, the people in Zababdeh have had to
pay exorbitant prices for water to be trucked to the village in rusty tankers, or they
have had to drink the unsanitary water from the cisterns under their houses. The
explicit rights of the Palestinian people to regional water resources are unspecified,
preventing Palestinians from improving the quantity and quality of water available
to them. The problem continues to be a source of friction in Palestinian-Israeli
2

United Nations Water Conference, Water Development and Management: Proceedings of the
United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 1977 (New York: Published for
the United Nations by Pergamon Press, 1978).
3
Palestinian Water Authority, url: http://www.pwa.ps/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabID=4126&
mid=11876&lang=en&ModeID=0&PageID=18http://www.pwa.ps/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabID=
4126&mid=11876&lang=en&ModeID=0&PageID=18 (accessed Oct. 29, 2010), in “Policy and Strategy”
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conflict negotiations.
Despite the absence of this basic right, Palestinians have remained relatively
peaceful on the issue of water. The rapid changes in the last century have proved to
be mostly improvements in the lives of people in Zababdeh. They had no incentive
to fight about water when their water situation was improving.
The pattern of improvement seems to have stagnated, though. Zababdeh has a
water network, people have taps in their houses, showers, and washing machines,
but the water supply is, as previously mentioned, inconsisent, unsanitary and
expensive. Water still has to be rationed and preserved for the long, hot summers.
It cannot be used to help grow Zababdeh’s economy because the people barely have
enough for their homes. Just a few kilometers from the village, though, Israelis
enjoy just the opposite: clean, cheap water that comes to their houses without
interruption and feeds their crops and industry. The obvious inequality may not
lead to violence, but it certainly engenders bitterness and enmity.
In chapter four I stopped just short of predicting, as so many other authors have
done, future water wars in Palestine. Water may never be a driver of wars or
uprisings in Palestine. Of the outstanding issues preventing resolution of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, water may not be the most prominent or significant,
even for the people of Zababdeh. Yet it is an indicator of the stifling situation in
which they live. The desire Zababdeh’s people most seem to hold is the ability to
improve their lives. They want to live in stability, to have their needs met. They
want to have water to cook with, to clean themselves and their homes, and to drink
without making themselves sick.
How much water the Israelis consume does not actually matter. What matters is
what the Palestinians do not have. They do not have stability, and their water
needs are not met. Indeed, the history of Palestinians in the West Bank throughout
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the 20th century has been of instability, falling under the administration of one after
another foreign government, each with different rules and regulations, none of whom
have served the interests of people in small communities like Zababdeh.
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Appendix A
Interviewee Information
Unless otherwise noted, I recorded all interviews on a digital voice recorder and
later transcribed them. Unless noted that the interview took place in English, all
interviews were conducted with the assistance of one of two Arabic translators.

Zababdeh Interviews
Abed. Interviewed June 1, 2008.
Abed was a Zababdeh municipality council member since 2005 and teacher
at a Zababdeh school. The interview took place in Abed’s home and was
conducted in English. One of my translators was present during the
interview and contributed comments as well.
Abu Jilal. Interviewed June 8, 2008.
Born in 1926, Abu Jilal descended from one of the men who settled
Zababdeh in the 1800s. My translator, who was a friend of one of Abu Jilal’s
sons, indicated that the family was a relatively wealthy one. The interview
was conducted on the patio at Abu Jilal’s home in one of the oldest
neighborhoods of Zababdeh.
Alad. Interviewed June 19, 2008.
Alad was born in approximately 1921. He and his wife farmed their lands for
nearly sixty years. His wife died in about 2006 and he retired from farming
the following year. Alad’s daughter, born about 1968, also contributed
comments to the interview, as well as another female relative.
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Ashraf. Interviewed June 3, 2008.
Ashraf had a masters degree in water engineering and had previously worked
for the Palestinian Hydrology Group, a non-governmental organization
concerned with water and environmental resources development. He was a
Zababdeh native and the interview was conducted in his parents’ home, with
both parents present for portions of the interview. My discussion with Ashraf
was conducted in English and involved a great deal of specialized information
and statistics about water resources in the West Bank. At one point in the
interview, I asked a question Ashraf thought his father would be able to
better answer. After that I spent several minutes asking his father, whom I
refer to as Abu Ashraf, born in 1948, questions about his memories of the
water situation in Zababdeh when he was younger. Ashraf translated my
questions and his father’s answers.
Bilal. Interviewed June 1, 2008.
Bilal was a farmer who owned the land on which the Qabatiya well was dug.
Another man, from the nearby city of Tubas, who worked doing maintenance
on the well, was also present and made comments during the interview.
Fairuz. Interviewed June 15, 2008.
Fairuz was born in 1927 and was my translator’s grandmother. Though a
native resident of Zababdeh, she also lived in the city of Jenin for forty-eight
years, from 1959 to 2007. The interview was conducted on the patio outside
her home.
Hani. Interviewed June 17, 2008.
Hani was born in 1933 in Zababdeh to a family with only female siblings
initially. Consequently, she indicated performing, as a youth, much of the
farming labor boys usually did. The interview took place in her home with
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her son and his wife present.
Jadda. Interviewed June 1, 2008.
Jadda was a Zababdeh woman born in 1925. She was a relative of one of my
translators, who never used her name but sometimes referred to her simply
as “my grandmother.” Jadda is the Arabic word for grandmother, so I use
the term to refer to her throughout this thesis. Jadda lived in Zababdeh all
her life, from the British Mandate to the Palestinian Authority era. Some of
her family members were present for the interview, though they did not
participate in the recorded conversation.
Majdi. Interviewed June 8, 2008.
Majdi was a Zababdeh municipality council member since 2005. During the
interview, Majdi provided me with the 2007 report on Zababdeh’s water
consumption. The interview took place in a municipality conference room in
English. One of my translators and some other council members who spoke
little English were also present.
Mayor of Zababdeh Municipality. Interviewed June 15, 2008.
The mayor was my translator’s uncle. Consequently, my translator only
referred to him as “my uncle,” so I have no other name for him. The mayor
had been in his position since an election in 2005. His mother was another
interviewee, Fairuz, and his interview was conducted in her home
immediately following her interview.
Miriam and Maria. Interviewed June 16, 2008.
Miriam was born in approximately 1936 and Maria was born about 1938.
The two women were sisters living together in the same house in which they
were raised. The interview was conducted in their home and a friend of my
translator was also present.
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Nayem. Interviewed June 15, 2008.
Nayem was born in 1947. The interview was conducted in his home with a
few of his family members present.
Naziha. Interviewed June 17, 2008.
Naziha was born and raised in Zababdeh but moved to Germany after she
got married. After living in Germany forty years, they moved back to
Zababdeh in 1998. One week after moving back, her husband died, and she
had lived alone since then. The interview was conducted in her home.
Rosa and Saliba. Interviewed June 19, 2008.
Rosa was born in approximately 1934 and her husband, Saliba, about 1930.
They both lived in Zababdeh their whole lives. A few relatives of Rosa and
Saliba were also in attendance during the interview.
Sharif. Interviewed June 15, 2008.
Sharif was born in 1922. The interview took place in her home. She
indicated that her family owned livestock when she was young. Her daughter,
born in 1959, contributed some comments in the interview, and her grandson
assisted my translator in explaining some of Sharif’s stories.
Silwa. Interviewed June 16, 2008.
Silwa, born in 1926, was a 1948 Arab-Israeli War refugee from Bisan, a
village near the Sea of Galilee in present-day Israel. After leaving her
hometown, she lived in the city of Nablus a few years, then in Jordan a few
years, and Jenin for nearly twenty years before coming with her son to
Zababdeh in 1998. She explained that she and her husand moved to Nablus,
Jordan, and Jenin in search of work. For a large portion of the interview, I
asked questions of Silwa’s son and his friend who drove a water tank in
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Zababdeh. For this portion of the interview, my translator’s friend, who also
spoke proficient English, assisted in translating the comments.
Wadia. Interviewed June 17, 2008.
Wadia lived in Zababdeh her entire life. She was born in 1924. The interview
took place on the patio outside her home and her daughter was present.

Professional Interviews
Engineer Abd Al Mo’men Afana, Head of Water Division and
Director of Research Center, Qalqilya Municipality.
Interviewed June 14, 2008.
The interview was conducted in Engineer Afana’s office at the Qalqilya
municipality building in Qalqilya, West Bank. A professor from the Arab
American University at Jenin, who introduced me to Engineer Afana, was
also present during the interview.
Ihab Barghothi, Palestinian Water Department.
Interviewed June 19, 2008.
The interview was conducted in Mr. Bargothi’s office at the Palestinian
Water Authority in Ramallah, West Bank.
Dr. Salah Al-Houdalieh, Department of Art, Al-Quds University.
Interviewed June 18, 2008.
The interview was conducted in Dr. Al-Houdalieh’s office at Al-Quds
University in Abu Dis, West Bank.
Engineer Bassam I.H. Sawalhi, Director of Operations Department at
the Jerusalem Water Undertaking, the water distributor for the
Ramallah/Al-Bireh District.
Interviewed June 2, 2008.
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The interview was conducted in Engineer Sawalhi’s office at the Jerusalem
Water Undertaking in Ramallah, West Bank. A dean from Al-Quds, who
introduced me to Engineer Sawalhi, was also present during the interview.
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Appendix B
Sources for Documents
Many of the documents significant in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have become
available on the internet. A website dedicated to the conflict in Palestine, the
United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL)1 posts
not just United Nations documents like the 1947 Partition Plan and Resolution 242
passed after the Six Day War, but also many other documents relevant to the
situation, including the Balfour Declaration and Britain’s White Papers for
Palestine. The website offers the full text of these and other documents without any
commentary, but notates those which are not UN documents. A few relevant
documents I was unable to locate in UN websites may be found on the International
Committee of the Red Cross website or the official website of the Palestinian Water
Authority.
Some of the Israeli military orders regarding Israel’s administration in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories are available from the Israel Law Resource Center
(ILRC).2 The website offers little information about the organization itself aside
from its goals:
1. To serve as a professional level resource for civil rights and human rights
lawyers doing legal work in Israel and the Palestinian territories she occupies.
1

United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, in UNISPAL, url: http:
//unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/home.htm (accessed Oct. 25, 2010).
2
Israel Law Resource Center, url: http : / / www . israellawresourcecenter . org (accessed
Jan. 18, 2010).
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2. To provide primary and secondary source material for researchers and activists
interested in civil rights and in fighting the legalized discrimination practiced
by the State of Israel.
3. To provide educational materials for educators and the public interested in
learning about and teaching about civil rights in the State of Israel and the
territories she occupies.
While the website displays the full text of many (though not all) documents,
some of the sources cited, including those for the military orders, are not themselves
primary sources. Combined with the lack of any explanation about the ILRC’s
background or the people involved with the organization, the problem of the sources
detracts from the legitimacy of the documents. However, the ILRC website is the
only place I have been able to gain access to the full text of the Israeli military
orders, and the text available complies with secondary descriptions of their content.

